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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
AD, Acción Democrática, or Democratic Action: is a people’s political party established in 1941
that played an essential role in the early years of Venezuelan democracy and led during the
country’s first democratic period (1945-1948).
bpd, barrels per day.
Bolívar Fuerte (Bs.F), VEF: currency in Venezuela since 2008 that replaced the Bolívar at the rate
of Bs.F. 1 = Bs. 1,000 in order to facilitate transactions and accounting.
Conferry, Consolidada de Ferrys C.A.: Venezuelan shipping company that operates freight and
passenger services to the islands of Margarita and Coche.
COPEI, Comité de Organización Politica Electoral Independiente, or Committee for Independent
Electoral Political Organization: is the working-class political party in Venezuela.
EEC-GNV, La Entidad Ejecutora de Conversión a Gas Natural Vehicular, or the Executing Agency
of CNG Conversion is a Bolivian agency in charged of converting gasoline- and diesel-powered
vehicles to natural gas-powered vehicles.
IESA or Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración: known in English as the Institute of
Advanced Studies in Administration is Venezuela’s leading business school, tripled accredited
by the three leading global business school accreditation associations and ranked among the
seven best in South America.
NGV, or natural gas vehicles.
PDVSA, Petróleos de Venezuela: government-run oil company in Venezuela.
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Abstract
This research examines the feasibility of a gasoline and diesel consumer subsidy phase-out in
Venezuela from a transportation planning perspective. It surveys the literature and discusses
case studies from Iran, Brazil, and Bolivia in order to identify the lessons that Venezuela can
learn from these countries’ successes and mistakes. It examines how strengthening and
investing in the public transportation system can be used as a means to gain public support for
the reform. I discuss the current political, social, and economic conditions that make a fossilfuel subsidy reform difficult, and offer suggestions from a transportation planner’s perspective
on how the transition can be made as smoothly as possible. Finally, I explore the opportunities
that present themselves to transportation planners in shaping the country’s future approach
toward transportation.

Venezuela; gasoline and diesel subsidies; phase-out reform; transportation planning.
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I.

Introduction

This thesis examines the role of transportation planners in a potential phase-out of fossil fuel
subsidies in Venezuela. Specifically, gasoline and diesel are subsidized directly in Venezuela, and
the artificially low prices of gasoline products over the last few decades have resulted in autocentric planning. If the subsidies are to be phased-out, then transportation planners have the
unique opportunity to play a central role in ensuring a smooth transition, as well as shape the
future of the country’s public transportation systems.
The Venezuelan government maintains strict price controls over the prices of gasoline
and diesel. Specifically, the government directly sets prices far below market value and
consumer gas and diesel prices have been nominally fixed since 1996. For the last seventeen
years the prices have been 0.07 BsF (Bolívares Fuertes) per liter for 91 octane gasoline, 0.097
BsF/liter for 95 octane gasoline, and 0.048 BsF/liter for diesel.1 For ease of comparison with the
United States, Table 1 shows per gallon prices of gasoline and diesel denominated in Bolivares
Fuertes as well as US dollars. Note that the prices are fixed in nominal Bolivares Fuertes and
therefore the price in US dollars depends on the exchange rate between the two currencies. As
of June 2013, Venezuela maintains a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar of 6.30 BsF/USD.2
Table 1 Gasoline and Diesel Prices in Venezuela, June 2013

BsF per gallon

$US per gallons

Diesel

0.18 BsF

$0.029 (3 cents)

Gas (91 octane)

0.27 BsF

$0.043 (4.3 cents)

Gas (95 octane)

0.37 BsF

$0.059 (6 cents)

Oil Product

Note: Octane numbers refer to the octane rating according to the RON method. Prices in USD
use the June 2013 official fixed exchange rate of 6.30 BsF/USD.

1

Note that there are different conventions used in calculating the octane value of gasoline across different
locations. The most common octane rating method worldwide –which is also the method used in Venezuela—is
the “Research Octane Number” (RON). In the United States, most gas stations show octane ratings using a “AntiKnock Index” that is sometimes written as “(R+M)/2” on the pumps. 91-octane (RON) gasoline in Venezuela is
regular gasoline that corresponds to 87-octane regular gasoline at US gas pumps.
2
The Black Market rate/parallel rate/market rate quadruples the official rate to about 31.5 BsF/USD (as of June
2013).
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The cost of selling gasoline to the population below market value is substantial: In a
recent study, Barrios & Morales (2012) calculate that gasoline subsidies in Venezuela
represented 3.16% of GDP in 2010.3 This is a larger proportion of GDP than all social transfer
programs combined (2.30% of GDP), and it is also a larger proportion of GDP than many other
important social expenditures (Barrios & Morales, 2012). For example, education expenditures
account for 2.51% of GDP, health expenditures for 2.02% of GDP, and citizen security for 0.34%
of GDP (Barrios & Morales, 2012). Since the market price of gasoline fluctuates and depends on
a number of economic variables, the cost of maintaining a fixed consumer price varies over
time. Using the same methodology as Barrios & Morales, I calculate that by 2012, the gasoline
subsidy had doubled to roughly 6.1% of GDP.4
Typical reasons for why developing countries support fossil-fuel subsidies include
alleviating poverty, promoting economic development, and securing political stability. However,
subsidizing fossil fuels to consumers has a number of negative unintended consequences.
Subsidies encourage wasteful consumption of natural non-renewable resources, the use of
automobiles as well as auto-oriented development. These also encourage fuel smuggling across
borders, which leads to a product loss that could otherwise be exported. The distortion in the
energy markets creates barriers to clean energy investment, discourages investment in
bio/alternative energy infrastructure, and increases CO2 emissions and local pollution.
Moreover, fossil-fuel subsidies tend to disproportionally benefit the middle and upper classes
of society: the very poor are still unlikely to be able to afford a car or otherwise benefit from
the low price of gasoline products.
Environmental challenges, aggravated by the rapid urbanization of cities and growth of
the global population, have caused a big push for developing countries, producers and
exporters of oil and its derivatives, to phase-out consumer subsidies to fossil fuels. The phasing
out of consumer fossil fuel subsidies is advocated by international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the German Agency for International
Cooperation, and the United Nations, among others.
In Venezuela, raising gasoline prices has become a taboo topic and supporting an
increase in prices can be considered political suicide. No serious attempts have been made in
recent years to increase prices at the national level. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, the
government has only been able to implement some purchasing restrictions in specifically
targeted areas. In particular, individuals may not purchase more than 10.8 gal every other day

3
4

Gasoline for private vehicles represents 52.3% of the total subsidized amount.
See Section IV for details regarding this calculation
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in some areas in order to curb the problem of smuggling cheap gasoline from the northeastern
Venezuelan state of Zulia across the border to Colombia, where prices are much higher.5
Thesis Statement
In this thesis I examine the feasibility of a gasoline and diesel consumer subsidy phase-out in
Venezuela from a transportation planning perspective. I look at what could be the role of
transportation planners in a possible fossil fuel subsidies phase-out reform in Venezuela. In
other words, how can planners help guide the process of becoming a more sustainable nation?
Specifically, I investigate how strengthening and investing in the public transportation system
can help ease the transition.
Part of the reason for the strong public resistance to any increase in gasoline prices is
the fact that transportation system has increasingly relied on the fact that gasoline is very
cheap, and important infrastructure has been neglected over the years for the sake of
supporting the price controls. I examine how strengthening an investing in the public
transportation system can be used as a means to gain public support for the reform. I discuss
the current political, social, and economic conditions that make a fossil-fuel subsidy reform
difficult, and offer suggestions from a transportation planner’s perspective on how the
transition can be made as smoothly as possible. Finally, I explore the opportunities that present
themselves to transportation planners in shaping the country’s future approach toward
transportation.
Methodology
I conduct a case study investigating the feasibility of a gasoline/diesel subsidy phase-out plan in
Venezuela. I describe the history of oil in Venezuela and its impact in the country’s society,
culture, economy and politics. I also analyze the present economic and political conditions using
recent financial indicators from international organizations like the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), the Institute for
Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), and the Global Subsidies Initiative.
Several other countries have attempted to phase out fossil-fuel subsidies and have
experienced varying degrees of success. I survey the literature and discuss case studies from
Iran, Brazil, and Bolivia in order to identify the lessons that Venezuela can learn from these
countries’ successes and mistakes. I look at how these countries managed and offset the rising
prices of goods and services that will result from a phase-out of gasoline subsidies. Rising prices
particularly affect the low-income population, and I emphasize the potential benefits of
transportation investment and how a strong transportation network facilitates social progress.

5

Similar restrictions also apply to the state of Táchira and the Amazon region.
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For this thesis, I chose the multiple case study research approach in order to compare
what different countries have done in terms of transportation policy and planning previous,
during and post fossil-fuel phase-out reform. Additionally, I examined the different outcomes
that these reforms have had on the transportation sector of each country. These cases were
informed through the scrutiny of decrees, acts, policy briefs, newspaper articles, as well as
economic indicators from the U.S. Energy Information Administration and other international
organizations.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II provides detailed
background information about the historical, social, and economic context in Venezuela.
Section III discusses a number of case studies from subsidy phase-outs in other countries.
Section IV describes the tasks that transportation planners face in order to make a phase-out
successful. Section V concludes with planning and policy recommendations.

4

II. Background Information about Venezuela
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is located in northern South America and covers an area
of 916,000 square kilometers (353,670 square miles). The nation is divided into 23 states and
has a total population of more than 29 million. Roughly four million people reside in the capital
city, Caracas. With more than 297.57 billion barrels, Venezuela is home of the biggest proven
crude oil reserves in the world and in 2010 it was the eighth-largest net oil exporter in the
world (Energy Information Administration, 2010; OPEC, 2012). See
Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Top 10 Oil Exporters in 2010
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Historical Context of Oil in Venezuela
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Before the discovery, exploration and subsequent production of oil in Venezuela, the country’s
economy was primarily relying on agriculture, largely depending on coffee production and to a
lesser extent, on cacao production. By 1914, Venezuela exported one million bags of coffee,
more coffee than any other country except Brazil (Frederick & Tarver, 2006). Venezuela became
an oil producer under the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-1935) when the first
commercial oil well was drilled on Lake Maracaibo, Zulia in 1914 (Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), 2012). Production and the first oil exports were delayed until 1917
due to World War I. The Gomez government offered incentives to the petroleum exploration
enterprise and, as oil became essential to industrialization throughout the world, foreign
investors’ interest in Venezuelan oil intensified.
The first Law of Hydrocarbons6 was enacted in Venezuela in 1920. The law incorporated
references to Mexican law and US law, and it marks the beginning of regulation of the oil
industry in Venezuela. Landlords were given preferential right to concessions on their lands,
limited to one year. A new Hydrocarbon Law was passed by 1921, and the new version
established relatively high royalty rates to be paid to the government for the exploration of
natural resources. This was done under the guise that the country’s natural resources are a
national patrimony. However, since the dictator Juan Vicente Gomez maintained tight control
over the government at the time, the law seems to have rather been designed to benefit
Gomez’s relatives and political friends. Concession dealers and oil companies united to promote
a third Law of Hydrocarbons in 1922 to reduce the royalty rates to be paid to the government
and offer former concessionaries the opportunity to extend their title deeds for a longer period
of time. By 1928 Venezuela had become the biggest oil-exporting country in the world. More
than 100 million barrels of oil were exported from Venezuela that year, surpassing the previous
biggest exporter Mexico (Frederick & Tarver, 2006).7
The Great Depression resulted in decreased worldwide demand for consumption goods.
This particularly affected Venezuela’s agricultural exports, primarily because coffee and cacao
were considered luxury goods at the time. Combined with an appreciation of the Bolivar against
other currencies, this resulted in a 21 percent decrease of export value in Venezuela (Cartay,
1996). While the oil sector also contracted during the crisis, it recovered much faster compared
to other sectors. As a result, Venezuela’s government became increasingly dependent on the oil
industry as a source of fiscal revenue, and the oil industry became increasing important to the
economy as a whole.

6

The official name of the law is Ley sobre Hidrocarburos y demás Minerales Combustibles en Venezuela
Venezuela remained the biggest oil exporter until 1970 when it was surpassed by the Middle East—Saudi Arabia,
Iran, and Iraq.
7

6

Various income tax schemes that started being implemented throughout the 1940s
resulted in increased government revenues from the oil industry. By 1948 a “fifty-fifty” rule was
implemented and companies and investors had to split their profit with the State at least 50%50%. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established in 1960 and all
oil-exporting countries and developing countries claimed Permanent Sovereignty over Natural
Resources (UN, 1962). This “OPEC Revolution” resulted in the eventual nationalization of the oil
and gas industry in 1976, with the establishment of Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima
(PDVSA). At that point international tenant companies were downgraded to service providers.
PDVSA provided the revenues necessary to invest in social programs, specially favoring
health and education. However, as oil prices were declining significantly during 1983 and 1984,
this let to cuts in spending on social transfer programs throughout the 1980 and led to the
gradual impoverishment of the middle-class.
In February 1989, president Carlos Andres Pérez, having just recently taken office for his
second term, launched a neoliberal/free-market reform characterized as a “shock program” of
economic austerity measures following the recommendations from the International Monetary
Fund. Pérez’s Plan de Ajuste Economico lacked political support due to its sudden
implementation. Most importantly, the plan included the withdrawal of subsidies and price
controls on a broad range of public services and consumer goods, including gasoline prices.8
The reform also initiated the apertura, or the opening of the economy to the world, once again
allowing PDVSA to enter into joint ventures with foreign companies and allowing private
investors back into the Venezuelan oil and gas industry (Mommer, 2004). The government’s
austerity measures, coupled with the sudden increase in consumer prices, and fueled by the
perception of the government continuously mismanaging funds9 contributed to mounting
tensions among the new middle-class poor.
The tensions among the population mounted and eventually resulted in several days of
rioting and looting in Caracas and other major cities in Venezuela around February 27, 1989.
These riots are now known as the infamous El Caracazo event that left hundreds dead in the
country’s worst outbreak of violence in decades. The disturbances consisted primarily of the
burning of urban transportation vehicles as well as the looting and destruction of commercial
properties, causing extensive damage to both public and private property. The government was
forced to order the mobilization of the military in order to contain the revolt.
8

The plan included sweeping reforms that affected all aspects of the economy. Foreign exchange markets and
interests rates were to be liberalized, trade restrictions reduced, and controls on foreign direct investment relaxed.
Additionally, the plan included a very ambitious privatization program.
9
Read: corruption.
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While El Caracazo was sparked by an increase in the price of bus fares resulting from
increased fuel costs, of course there were many other factors that led to tensions rising to such
an extent. However, the memory of the event is frequently employed in current political
rhetoric as an example of how capitalism and neoliberal measures impoverish people. Since
fuel prices were at the heart of the issue that triggered the violence, politicians are unwilling to
publicly entertain the thought of reforms involving the fossil-fuel subsidies.
Perez’s reforms were only partially implemented, but nonetheless affected the
livelihoods of all Venezuelans, particularly the poorest. This discontent resulted in the failed
1992 coup d’état attempt led by Hugo Chávez Frías. During his campaign to be elected
president by legal means in 1998, Hugo Chavez Frías presented the narrative that some people
benefited more than others from the oil rent and revenues. He again drove home the point that
capitalism impoverishes people and he guaranteed that –once elected—oil would be for
everyone. He emphasized that “el petróleo es de todos,” which translates roughly into the
sentiment that Venezuela’s petroleum, considered the biggest national heritage, is the people’s
to enjoy.
There are several important facets to the slogan “el petroleo es de todos”. On one hand,
it means that the revenues generated from the exploitation of the country’s oil reserves should
be spent on social programs that will benefit the general population. This idea resonated very
strongly, especially among the poor, who felt that they had been neglected for the previous 40
years of democratic rule. On the other hand, the slogan also presents a very direct claim on the
resource itself. If the oil is there for everyone to enjoy, then not only is the revenue generated
from the oil industry the people’s to enjoy, but the petroleum products themselves are
promised to the people.
While the government has funded numerous social programs to benefit the poor, the
idea that “petroleum is (truly) everyone’s” has yet to materialize. Control over oil revenues are
used as a political leverage. The fact that the redistribution of oil rent is entirely up to the
discretion of the government has been used to reward supporters of the current regime as well
as to punish their detractors. The government has used the premise that the oil resources
belong to the people not to empower citizens in the managing of their own incomes, but rather
to empower its executive branch. The exception, of course, is the price of gasoline: it is still
subsidized heavily and prices are held artificially low (refer to Table 1 in the first section.)

8

Economic Conditions related to the Subsidy Phase-out
When discussing a potential phase-out of fossil fuel subsidies in Venezuela, it is necessary to
consider current economic conditions. A removal of price subsidies can be considered a type of
austerity measure if government expenditures in other areas of the economy are not increased
simultaneously. Decreases in government expenditures are generally considered contractionary
fiscal policy, and therefore a phase-out of the subsidies has the potential to further hurt an
already weak economy. This point becomes even more important when considering the size of
the subsidy: Barrios and Morales (2012) estimate that the magnitude of the domestic gasoline
consumption subsidy is 3.16% of GDP.
Table 2 Economic Indicators in Venezuela
2000

2003

2008

2010

2011

6,200

4,800

13,500

12,700

12,700

GDP growth (percent)

3.2

-9.2

4.8

-1.9

4.2

Inflation (percent)

13

31.1

30.4

28.19

26.09

31.893

49.294

24.553

38.361

45.5

Current account balance (percent of GDP)

10.12

14.14

11.86

4.88

8.60

Oil consumption per capita (liters)

1,232

1,273

1,895

1,531

1,585

46.3

62.1

32.6

32.5

31.9

GDP per capita ($US)

Gross public debt (percent of GDP)

Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line
(% of pop.)

Source: CIA World Factbook, The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund
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Figure 2 Bolívar Fuerte per US Dollar official and parallel exchange rates, 2003-2013
24.00
22.00

Bolívares Fuertes/$US

20.00
18.00
16.00
14.00
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
Official

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
1.60 1.92 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 4.30 4.30 4.30 6.29

Parallel 1.63 1.89 2.65 2.81 4.75 4.37 6.16 7.83 8.66 11.3 22.3

The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Venezuela for 2012 was estimated at
US$13,200 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). Additionally, in 2012 Venezuela ranked in the
top ten countries with highest inflation among 224 countries with a rate estimated at 20.9 %
(OECD, 2012) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2013). Today, the petroleum sector dominates the
Venezuelan economy. Oil revenues account for approximately 94 % of exports, more than 50 %
of federal budget revenues, and around 30 per cent of gross domestic product (OPEC, 2012).10
Venezuela’s currency, the Bolivar Fuerte (BsF), has been increasingly overvalued since
currency exchange became controlled in 2003. While there have been some adjustments of the
fixed exchange rates with the US dollar, the parallel (i.e. black market) exchange rates are still
several orders of magnitude higher than official rates. Figure 2 shows Bolivar Fuerte’s official
and parallel exchange rates from 2003-2013. The difference between the official and the
parallel exchange rates has been increasing dramatically over the last few year. This suggests
10

Interestingly, despite politicians’ popular rhetoric against the United States, the U.S. is Venezuela’s
most important export and import partner. More than 40% of Venezuelan exports are exported to the
U.S. and almost 29% of Venezuelan imports are coming from the U.S. (Central Intelligence Agency,
2013).
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that a devaluation of the Bolivar Fuerte is likely to occur soon, and is indeed necessary.
However, officials are reluctant to devaluate due to fears of increasing inflation. With inflation
rates of more than 35 percent during the first two quarters of 2013 alone, any policy that has
the potential to add to inflation is problematic.

The Role of the National Oil Company
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) has financed the Executive’s social programs, or misiones
sociales, since 2004. This is done through the Fund for Social and Economic Development of
Venezuela (FONDESPA) that was created to redistribute the oil rent via social programs. The
misiones include education, health, housing, energy, and cultural programs that aim at securing
the basic needs of the poorest segments of the Venezuelan population. Since prices for basic
necessities such as food have been rising sharply, PDVSA also supports Pdval, a subsidized food
program that is charged with providing affordable food to Venezuelans. However, even these
supermarkets –as well as the other government-run store Mercal—are plagued by the scarcity
of products.
PDVSA has been charged with a number of responsibilities in many public arenas, but it
has several internal issues that are hurting its operations. First, the conditions of Venezuela’s
refinery system are deteriorating, primarily due to a lack of investment in maintenance as well
as poor management. During the first 9 months of 2012, PDVSA had reported forty-five
incidents for that year, many of them major (Trujillo, 2012). For example, a gas leak at the
Amuay refinery on August 25, 2012 triggered an explosion that killed 42 people, injured a dozen
more, and damaged about 1,600 homes (Parraga, 2012). Amuay is the world’s second largest oil
refinery complex and the largest refinery in Venezuela. Together with a second accident at the
El Palito facility that occurred about the same time, these incidents resulted in a 45 % drop in
Venezuela’s exports of oil derivatives to the United States (Tovar, 2013). In fact, the accidents
caused a large spike in imports of oil byproducts from the United States.
Despite the fact that Venezuela is very oil rich, its refining capacity constraints and
problems cause a lot of petroleum products to be imported. In December 2012, Venezuela
imported 6.1 million barrels of total petroleum products from the United States, out of which
2.9 million barrels were finished motor gasoline. During the entire years of 2012, Venezuela
imported a total of 12.6 million barrels of finished motor gasoline. This is a very large increase
compared to the 1.0 million barrels that were imported in 2011 (U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2013). See Figures 3a-3b for the recent development in Venezuelan imports of
petroleum products.
11

Since the imported gasoline is sold domestically at heavily subsidized prices, but must be
purchased internationally at the market price, the direct expense due to maintaining the
gasoline subsidy is significant. Phasing out the price subsidies, and investing the saved
expenditures in infrastructure maintenance and development, as well as spending some of the
saving on social programs to directly counteract the effect of rising prices is becoming an
increasingly attractive option.

The Gasoline Subsidy and Gasoline Consumption
Gasoline (and diesel) subsidies have existed in Venezuela for as long as forty to fifty years.
Gasoline and diesel prices are set by the Ministerio del Poder Popular de Petróleo y Minería.
Venezuela has the lowest gasoline prices in the world averaging less than 2 US cents per Liter or
between 4.3 and 6 US cents per gallon depending on the octane (Wagner, 2010/2011).
A primary reason that governments implement policies to subsidize gasoline (and other
energy or fossil fuels) is to make energy affordable to low-income people. However, the
gasoline (and diesel) subsidy in Venezuela is a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT), where the
condition is driving. According to Barrios and Morales, private vehicles consume 52.3% of the
total subsidized amount of gasoline (Barrios & Morales, 2012). Even more interesting is the fact
that 62% of the private consumption can be attributed to the richest quartile of the population
(Barrios & Morales, 2012). Public transportation only accounts for 30.62% of all internal road
sector gasoline consumption (Barrios & Morales, 2012). This means that higher income
households are benefiting more from the subsidies than the lower-income population.
Table 3 shows that realized prices have stayed at the same low level, while the level of
internal consumption has increased 28.22% since 2008. It is very likely that low real prices at
the pump are encouraging wasteful consumption. Table 3 also shows that throughout the
years, with the exception of 2009, the implicit cost of the gasoline subsidy has increased as
percentage of GDP. Additionally, Figure 2 illustrates that Venezuela has one of the highest
levels of road sector gasoline fuel consumption (in kilograms of oil equivalent or kgoe) per
capita in the region—excluding the United States. Venezuela’s per capita consumption is even
higher than the more productive developing countries like Argentina, Chile, Panama, Uruguay,
and Mexico (See Appendix A for a Regional Comparison of Diesel Fuel Consumption, GDP per
Capita and Fossil-Fuel Consumption Subsidies).
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Figure 3 Regional Comparisons of Gasoline Fuel Consumption, GDP per Capita and Fossil-Fuel
Consumption Subsidies

The implicit cost of the gasoline subsidy in 2012 was of 6.09% of GDP, roughly doubling 2010’s
percentage of GDP. In terms of total expenditure levels, the implicit cost of the gasoline
subsidy was US$ 23.21 billion in 2012, which was approximately five times more compared to
what was invested that year in transportation infrastructure and public transit.
An additional problem is the massive amount of gasoline that is smuggled across the
borders into Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana. Smuggling began in the early 2000s when oil prices
began to rise. Since then, the price gaps between Venezuela and its neighboring countries have
widened as a result of the different energy policies these countries have adopted. The
smuggling of gasoline is a direct consequence of subsidies the Venezuelan government grants
to the consumption of gasoline produced in Venezuela. It is difficult to calculate how much of
the gasoline consumed is actually gasoline that is being smuggled across the borders. Horacio
Medina, a former manager of the state-owned oil company, suggests that the volumes involved
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in these operations are not merely carried out by individuals who fill up their tanks and cross
the border, but by the use of tank trucks and river barges transporting thousands of gallons
across the border every day to sell them in Colombia for profit (Delgado, 2012). This is a very
lucrative business: Gasoline purchased at 1.5 cents per liter in Venezuela can be sold just across
the border in Cucutá, Colombia for $1.30 a liter—a 117-times price difference (Delgado, 2012).
In the border areas, the cost of maintaining the price subsidy also includes the
expenditures on efforts to counteract the smuggling of gasoline. At the border with Colombia,
this includes the administration of the program that implants a computer chip in motorists’
vehicles, restricting the amount of gasoline purchased to 41 liters (10.8 gallons) every other
day. At the Brazilian border, Brazilians traveling into Venezuela are required to get a certificate
from their Federal Revenue agency, enabling them to purchase fuel at one specific gas station
that is supervised by Venezuelan Jungle Infantry Battalion, at a price of $1.77 a gallon (Rohter,
2006). This is still one-third of the Brazilian pump price, but more than 40 times the price at
other gas stations in the area. Administering these programs significantly adds to the cost of
maintaining the subsidy, at no direct benefit to the Venezuelan people.

Table 3 Evolution of the Implicit Gasoline Subsidy

Export Prices ($US per Liter)
Average Official Exchange Rate
Export Prices (BsF per Liter)
Realized Prices (BsF per Liter)
Gasoline Subsidy (BsF per Liter)
Internal Consumption of Gasoline (Bn of Liters)
Total Gasoline Subsidy (Real 2010 Bn BsF)
Total Gasoline Subsidy (Real 2010 Bn $US)
Total Gasoline Subsidy (%GDP)
Sources: PDVSA, MENPET, BCV, BLS, and EIA.
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2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

0.65
2.15
1.4
0.01
1.39
16.66
56.40
26.23
3.61

0.43
2.15
0.93
0.01
0.92
16.83
30.16
14.03
1.99

0.54
3.26
1.77
0.01
1.76
18.28
49.28
15.12
3.3

0.73
4.3
3.139
0.01
3.129
17.00
87.79
20.42
5.65

0.74
4.3
3.182
0.01
3.172
23.21
99.82
23.21
6.09

Figure 4 US Exports to Venezuela
(a)

(b)

(c)
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Figure 5 Costs of Venezuela Premium Gasoline (US-Cents per Liter)
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Other considerations
The government of Hugo Chávez Frías as well as his successor have focused on “oil diplomacy”
with other Latin American countries. For those countries that share the late president Chavez’s
Bolivarian Revolutionary agenda, such as Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, and
Cuba’s Castro brothers, the Venezuelan government provides inexpensive to free oil for various
foreign-policy reasons. In addition to free oil, the Venezuelan government has built a number of
refinery and energy facilities throughout the continent. These foreign give-away policies
generate international support from neighboring nations, but have been a source of discontent
internally given the deteriorated condition of the country’s infrastructure and economy.
Increases in domestic prices for petroleum products will certainly be met with some opposition
if consumers believe they have to pay for something that foreign partner countries get for free.

Summary
The oil industry has been, and still is, an important player in all aspects of the Venezuelan
society. While there is a strong sense of entitlement for oil products in the minds of many
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citizens, problems with the national oil company make it very difficult to continue maintaining
the large price subsidies. Since the national oil company is involved in aspects of the economy
and everyday life –such as social welfare programs and even supermarkets— changes in the
prices of gasoline are likely to have very far-reaching consequences. As a transportation
planner, it is not possible to address all of the challenges that occur due to a phase-out of the
price subsidies. However, an increase of fuel prices has a most direct impact on individuals’
personal transportation situations. Therefore, I focus on a transportation planner’s point of
view in providing recommendations that could make a phase-out of price subsidies for gasoline
as smooth as possible. Moreover, I provide suggestions for investments in the transportation
infrastructure that have the potential of promoting equity and economic development, without
the need for artificially low energy prices.
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III. The Fossil Fuel subsidies Phase-Out Solution
Case Studies
The case studies in this section explore two oil-producing and exporting countries—Iran and
Brazil— and one oil-importing country—Bolivia—that have adopted reforms to phase out
subsidies to energy products. I lay out the background for each of these countries at the time
the reform is adopted. I explore the political and socio-economic objectives of the phase-out as
well as some of the mitigation measures. I also expand on what each country did or had been
doing in terms of public transportation and infrastructure. Finally I summarize and analyze the
importance of these cases in the Venezuelan case.
The three case studies were selected because each has a clear link with or influence
over Venezuela. Overall the main government is in charged of planning and organizing public
transportation in these three countries as well as in Venezuela. Even though municipalities or
local governments might have some liberties when it comes to planning, the provision of public
transportation is for the most part centralized. Brazil and Bolivia share geographical proximity,
socio-economic conditions and political characteristics with Venezuela. Venezuela’s next-door
neighbor, Brazil, was able to phase out subsidies to gasoline, diesel and LPG in a period of a
decade without major resistance—a feat for any major economic reform. However, Brazil’s
most recent protests generated by increasing fare prices of low-quality public transportation
raises the question of whether investing in public transportation earlier or even previous to the
reform would have helped today’s outcome. Additionally, these events emphasize the
important role that public transportation plays in the long-term success of a phase-out reform
and in the future stability of developing countries.
On the other hand, Bolivia’s case is a reminder that a reform implemented too fast, with
a weak plan, and lack of transparency and communication to the public can be catastrophic.
Bolivia is a perfect example as well because the two countries share Hugo Chavez’s popular
political agenda of “socialism of the 21st century.” Finally, Iran—though geographically distant—
shares close economic ties with Venezuela. The two governments currently collaborate in
many projects. Over the last decade, the two nations have signed more than 270 treaties,
which have included trade deals and agreements on automobile factories, construction
projects, energy initiatives, and banking programs (Mungin & Shoichet, 2013). If there is one
thing that Venezuela should learn from Iran, it is how to approach a phase-out reform
successfully, avoiding making the same mistake of incrementing prices too fast.
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The Case of Iran
One of the most recent successes in subsidized energy reform is Iran. In March 2010, the
parliament ratified the Targeted Subsidies Reform Act11, which called for a gradual increase of
energy prices within a five-year period (2010-2015). Most specifically, the Reform Act
comprised various policies meant to increase the prices of numerous goods and services that
were subsidized. The reform included the phase out of retail prices of petrol, diesel, fuel oil,
kerosene and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to at least 90 % of Persian Gulf free on board (FOB)
prices. Electricity and Water prices are also set to increase to cover full cost price. In addition,
the reform act also stipulates gradual subsidies elimination for food items and services like the
postal, air and rail services within the same period of time.
In December 2010, the Iranian Government undertook bold economic reforms to phase
out energy subsidies, replacing them with nationwide cash transfers as compensation for rising
energy prices. The reform was adopted in order to promote higher standards of living and
minimize income inequalities.
Objectives of the Reform
As international oil prices reached their highest in July, 2008 at $143.95 (Europe Brent Spot
Price) per crude oil barrel, and gasoline prices around the world hovered at more or less $2 per
liter, Iran’s domestic prices remained at an unsustainable price of US$0.10 per liter—ten times
more than the price of gasoline in Venezuela (Guillaume, Zytek, & Reza Farzin, 2012). However,
like Venezuela, Iran was forced to increase imports of gasoline and oil-based products in order
to supply domestic demand. In addition to fuel waste, fuel smuggling to neighboring countries
where energy prices were sold at higher prices pressured officials to find a permanent fix to
these problems.
The main objective of the reform was to reduce waste by rationalizing consumption. In
order to reduce energy demand effectively, the Government believed the price increase had to
be meaningful. Price increases had to be sufficient to reduce excessive demand and discourage
inefficient substitution. Compensating households for energy price increases would allow
consumers to purchase more of other goods and services while at the same time discouraging
gasoline consumption.
11

For a copy of the Targeted Subsidies Reform Act, see Appendix I. Subsidy Reform Law from Iran-The Chronicles
of the Subsidy Reform, by Guillaume, D., Zytek, R., & Reza Farzin, M. (2012).
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Preparing the field for Reform
It was essential that the government ensured low rates of inflation before the start of the
reform, due to the intrinsic price increments of other goods and services once the subsidies
were lifted. Mid 2008, the Central Bank forecasted that inflation would fall into the single digits
by fall of 2010 from 30% to 7%, which was in fact evidenced by the appreciation of the Iranian
Rial in September of 2010 (Guillaume, Zytek, & Reza Farzin, 2012). Administrative policies were
also used to stabilize prices, preventing producers and retailers from price gauging in
anticipation of the reform.
In June 2007, an electronic card system for gasoline rationing was introduced on par
with “free market” priced gasoline. Once the quota of gasoline was met, price of fuel increased
as well but remained below the full price at which the population could purchase unlimited
amount of fuel. Households received a substantial amount of cheap gasoline per month that
was gradually reduced in 2010, stimulating the demand for fuel at higher prices (Hassanzadeh,
2012).
Preceding the reform, officials frequently met with the different sectors of the economy
to discuss their concerns in hopes to better understand the potential impact of the reform on
their businesses (IMF Survey Magazine, 2013). Fifty-eight percent of companies analyzed were
selected to receive targeted assistance through either direct assistance or through the sale of
limited quantities of fuels at a subsidized or discounted rates to lower the impact of the price
increases on the input costs (Guillaume, Zytek, & Reza Farzin, 2012).
The Banking Sector in Iran played a huge role in the reform process, as banks are in
charge of distributing the targeted subsidies to households. Transfers are made directly to bank
accounts instead of through cash donations by regional and local governments. This method
allowed the recipients to see the transfers before the actual price increase, which was
important in gaining the public’s approval for the reform.
Mitigation Measures
A multi-tier pricing system was implemented to mitigate the reform’s impact and encourage
rational energy consumption. Multi-tier tariffs were used on electricity, natural gas and water in
an effort to moderate the impact of the price increases on the poor. These price increases also
took into account regional disparities in availability and regional conditions.
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Households received up to fifty percent of the fiscal revenue resulting from price
increases through in-cash and in-kind payments as well as through the creation of a social
security system that includes the introduction of health insurance and house mortgage loans.
Authorities first thought cash transfers would be targeted to the poorest in society; however,
denying compensation for the upper income groups risked evoking public discontent among
the biggest energy users. Everyone was allowed to apply for the transfers, however the richest
households were discouraged to apply. The approval rate to receive compensatory cash
transfers was extremely high for applicants (98%) and by May 2011, seventy million Iranians (of
75 million) had registered to receive the transfers (Guillaume, Zytek, & Reza Farzin, 2012).
Distribution of the cash transfers or “targeted subsidies” took place over four weeks preceding
the price increase. On October 19th the government started depositing money into
beneficiaries’ accounts. These deposits were frozen until the day energy prices increased.
Additionally the reform designated a 30 % share of the revenue from price increases to
support industries and producers through interest subsidies on loans for the adoption of new
energy-saving technologies and credit lines to reduce the impact of higher energy costs on
cash-flow. The remaining 20% share is for the government to cover its subsequent increases in
costs and to improve infrastructure.
PR to sell the Reform
An extensive public relations campaign preceded the reform to educate the population on the
real costs of low energy prices. Meetings and seminars were held to educate people on the
inefficiency and wastefulness of low energy prices. Officials emphasized the social inequalities
as a result from cheap energy. The authorities stressed from the get go that the reforms were
not about eliminating subsidies completely, but transferring subsidies from products to
households. Therefore benefiting the poor who would get cash benefits, while it is generally
accepted that cheap energy mostly benefits higher-income groups.
Impacts of the Reform
The reform failed to define a rate on which prices should reach their international market price
within the five-year period. The government took the “shock therapy” approach increasing
prices to counteract wasteful consumption. This resulted in an exacerbated rate of inflation
(Guillaume, Zytek, & Reza Farzin, 2012). Immediately after the start of the Reform on December
19, 2010, price controls were imposed on most products forcing companies to reduce
consumer and industrial goods prices. Additionally, the authorities have efficiently addressed
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many immediate problems by reducing energy prices or allocating additional quotas at low
prices to the most vulnerable groups, thus guaranteeing social stability.
Transportation Sector
In order to cushion the effects of rising energy prices on other basic commodities, and control
inflation, the Iranian government classified the post-reform prices into three categories:
subsidized, semi-subsidized and free market prices. Subsidized and semi-subsidized prices were
allocated to the transportation sector. For instance, gasoline prices were held at a subsidized
rate of 1000 rials/liter for governmental vehicles used in the industrial and agricultural sectors,
while domestically manufactured vehicles with an engine size of less than 2L were allowed to
purchase semi-subsidized gasoline at 4,000 rials/liter (Hassanzadeh, 2012). Additionally, the
government held a semi-subsidized diesel price (1,500 rials/Liter) for public transportation in
order to ensure that transit fares would remain low and to encourage its use.
Table 3 Fossil-Fuels Price Increase

Fuel Product
Gasoline
Diesel

Regular
Premium

Pre-Reform
Price
(IRR/Liter)
1000
1500
165

Post-Reform Price (IRR/Liter)
Subsidized
1000
-

Semi-Subsidized
4000
1500

Free Market
7000
8000
3500

Note. Reprinted from Recent Developments in Iran's Energy Subsidy Reforms, p. 3, by Elham
Hassanzadeh, 2012. International Institute for Sustainable Development.

Previous to the implementation of the reform, the Iranian government seems to have
anticipated the importance in maintaining and supporting a reliable and affordable public
transportation network throughout the country. In fact, Iran began revamping its public
transport system in the early 2000s. The country started moving towards supporting a more
sustainable form of urban mobility and living well before the fossil-fuel phase out reform was
adopted.
In 2007, in addition to adopting a program to ration gasoline and diesel consumption,
the government of Iran passed a law requiring carmakers to manufacture dual-use cars that can
run on gasoline or natural gas. Since Iran has the second largest reserves of natural gas in the
world, compressed natural gas (CNG) could be an alternative energy source. The government
also examined alternative means of transportation. That same year, the Iranian parliament
passed a public transportation bill titled the Public Transportation Development and Fuel
Consumption Management Law designed to improve and expand subway, railway, and bus
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systems (Mohammadi, Maknoon, & Arabyarmohammadi, 2011). Article 1 of this law makes the
government responsible of developing urban and suburban mass transit as well as of managing
fuel consumption. The law establishes that public transportation must be optimized through
technical inspections, the development of a rail transportation network, the conversion of
gasoline and diesel burning vehicles into dual fuel vehicles, and innovations in fuel efficiency.
Article 6 of this law also requires that the share of public transportation in total trips within
cities increase from 41% to 75% (Mohammadi, Maknoon, & Arabyarmohammadi, 2011).
Iran currently has three Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems, one of which is located in the
capital, Tehran12. The year the reform went into effect, Tehran’s BRT added 4 more lines to the
3 existing ones. By 2011 the system had a total of 150-km of BRT. Two of the most recent lines
to open saw an increase in the number of people using public transportation by 31% and 35%
and a decrease in commuting times of 24% and 42% respectively (Intelligent Transportation
Systems Research Institute-AUT, 2012). The success of Tehran’s BRT system and the growth of
ridership experienced in the last five years has led to plans to expand the system, adding more
routes and buses. As of September 2010, the Tehran municipal government has also
implemented a bike rental program to add to the existing—and expanding—transportation
network, which also includes a Metro system. Additionally, other major cities have also
invested heavily in public transportation. Two other major cities—Shiraz and Tabriz—are
undergoing construction for subway systems, and a third city—Kerman—has been approved to
also get a metro system.
Although it is still too early to assess the long-term outcomes that the fossil-fuel
products’ price liberalization will have on transportation patterns, transit use, and even in land
use policy and planning, there are clear indicators that Iran chose early on to invest in public
transportation over vehicles; a decision that is likely to have made a greater difference to a
large part of the population after the gasoline and diesel subsidies were removed completely.
The government invested to diversify transportation options and help alleviate some of the
effects of liberalizing fossil-fuel prices.
Lessons Learned
Iran’s experience with the phase-out reform has been successful for the most part, because the
government established early on communication with the public. Additionally, previous to the
implementation of the reform, the government was very effective at preparing the country’s
economy, a process that took three years. A number of measures were adopted before the
reform in order to prepare and familiarize citizens to the phase-out prices. Thus making people
more receptive of the gradual change and less likely to demonstrate.

12

Tehran’s BRT inaugurated in 2007.
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In terms of transportation, Iran has been transitioning into supporting a more
sustainable transport system since the early 2000s when the government started investing in
the expansion of the country’s transportation network, specifically benefitting public transit
projects. The country has added 3 BRT systems and a metro system, while a number of BRT
lines and 2 more subways are currently under construction. Transportation operators are
granted a semi-subsidy of diesel fuels so that transport fares remain low. In addition, 30% of
the amount saved by the government will be used to strengthen and expand public
transportation, as well as fuel and energy reduction infrastructure, industry and farming.
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The Case of Brazil
Background
During the 1960s cross-subsidies were introduced to equalize prices for consumer prices of
petroleum products across Brazil. A single pricing strategy was adopted for oil products
nationwide regardless the differences in transportation and refining costs. During the 1970s
and 1980s, fueled in large part by two oil crises, international oil prices increased. Brazil’s
economy was plagued with high inflation, low growth and fiscal imbalances. According to the
International Monetary Fund, inflation in Brazil averaged 272 % and economic growth was
about 3 percent (Clements, et al., 2013). Brazil’s net public debt increased from 24 percent GDP
to 40 percent of GDP from 1981 to 1989 (Clements, et al., 2013). The discretionary policies used
to adjust oil prices had adverse consequences for the sector, especially under the unstable
macroeconomic conditions. Consequently, oil underpricing contributed to low investment in
exploration and refining capacity. The country still imported about eighty per cent of its
domestic oil consumption (Clements, et al., 2013). These deplorable conditions pressured
officials to shift away from the country’s import-substitution policies and liberalize the
economy. However, half a century of energy subsidies created resistance to subsidy removal
from important stakeholders. The government’s opposition saw these reforms as a constraint
on industrial growth.
Objectives of the Reforms
Besides the removal of subsidies, the reform agenda encouraged private investment and
competition (De Oliveira & Laan, 2010). In the 1990s the import-substitution policies were
abandoned and liberalization and privatization of the energy sector and Brazilian economy as a
whole began. The objective was to introduce competition and improve economic efficiency.
Competition would reduce costs and provide real prices to consumers, which would in turn
promote energy conservation and efficiency, while also increasing government revenue.
In order to minimize opposition from groups that benefitted from the previous energy policy,
the removal of subsidies and movement to free-market prices was gradual. To build public
support, the government assured consumers that privatizing and liberalizing the energy sector
would lower energy prices and improve services, thus rewarding consumers for the subsidies
removal. Liberalizing of fuel prices, which also happened in various steps, began in the early
1990s with the liberalization of prices for petroleum derivatives used mainly by firms such as
asphalt and lubricants. Following, a more extensive liberalization included gasoline prices for
consumers (1996), LPG for final consumers (1998), and diesel prices for consumers (2001).
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Table 4 Gradual Liberalization of Fossil-Fuel Prices

Year
1991
1993
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Liberalization
Lubricants, residuals, kerosene
Gasoline for airplanes
Ethanol and gasoline
Asphalt
LPG
Gasoline and fuel oil
Naphtha for petrochemicals
Gasoline, diesel and LPG adjusted to
Brent prices every 3 months.

User
Final consumers
Final consumers
Final consumers
Final consumers
Final consumers
at refinery gates
at refinery gates
Final consumers

Note. Adapted from Lessons Learned from Brazil's Experience with Fossil-Fuel
Subsidies and their Reform, p. 7, by Adilson de Oliveira and Tara Laan, 2010.

Mitigation Measures
In 2001, the government introduced a new tax on petroleum derivatives import and marketing.
The tax-raised revenues are used to subsidize ethanol producers and the transportation costs of
hydrocarbons; fund the gas voucher program for low-income families; fund projects concerned
with environmental protection, and fund the construction and expansion of roadways
(Clements, et al., 2013). In 2002, after the removal of general LPG subsidies, the government
introduced a new subsidy for LPG through the allocation of gas voucher to help low-income
families. Until 2012, the government also subsidized the supply of fuels to thermal plants in the
Amazon region. And finally, conditional cash transfer programs were also set into motion. For
instance, Bolsa Escola (2001-2003) was a program that “provided mothers of poor households a
monthly stipend conditional on their children’s regular school attendance” (de Janvry, et al.,
2005).
Transportation Sector
The fossil-fuel phase out reform in Brazil cannot be said to have spurred a whole lot of interest
and investment from the federal and local governments to provide public transportation.
Though many Brazilian cities do offer public transportation either through complex bus
networks or metros, most of the investments—as well as the public policies behind them—
have been mainly in support to expand roads and build bridges to counteract congestion and
unequivocally encourage private vehicle travel (Vasconcellos, 2005). Cities throughout Brazil—
with the exception of Curitiba—are lagging behind when it comes to public transit and
infrastructure investment, even when taking into account the number of Bus Rapid Transit
(BRT) systems that have cropped up in light of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer
Olympics Games (Martins Izidoro, 2011). For instance, experts agree that São Paulo
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Metropolitan Region (SPMR), comprised of 39 cities and a population of approximately
seventeen million people, has one of the worst traffic problems in the country due to the
decrease in the use of public transit and the increase in the use of private cars (Martins Izidoro,
2011; Vasconcellos, 2005). An anecdote gathered from a report by the Economist Intelligent
Unit (2011) makes reference to a 182-mile long traffic jam that clogged the streets of São Paulo
in June 10th 2009, while in 2010 the average daily back up was 67 miles long.
Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that without the fossil-fuel subsidy phase-out reform
of the last two decades, the traffic problem in São Paulo and other auto-centric cities would be
much worse today. As mentioned earlier, subsidies to gasoline and diesel consumer prices
generate wasteful consumption and in many cases it makes driving more appealing—and
overall less expensive trip-wise—than riding public transit.
In contrast, it is likely that the phase-out reform did not affect cities like Curitiba to the
same extent that it did auto-centric cities like São Paulo. Jaime Lerner’s pioneering integrated
transportation network in Curitiba is in many ways the model of sustainable transportation. The
city’s major accomplishment was the integration of transportation and land use planning
through its Master Plan. Such integration encouraged commercial development along the five
transport axes that radiate out from the city center. Therefore, the city center is very
pedestrian friendly and inaccessible to private automobiles. Land within two blocks of the main
axes is zoned for high density, which helps generate more ridership. Zoned residential densities
decrease as you move farther away from the main transit axes. Additionally, due to the high
densities and close arrangement of businesses and residential areas, walking and biking are
viable means of getting around in the city. A 2007 study shows that walking accounts for 35% of
the daily trips while collective transport accounts for 28% and individualized transportation (i.e.
taxi, automobiles, motorcycles, and bicycles) accounts for 37% of all trips (CAF, 2011).
The idea of an integrated system of buses that operates urban, suburban and periurban
routes was first conceived in this city, about thirty years ago by a group of cost-conscious and
environmentally-friendly planners. Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is effective because ideally it should
integrate and encompass a hierarchical system of services, which includes the different types of
fleet present in that city. In Curitiba, for instance, mini buses travel through neighborhoods and
residential routes, feeding them into conventional buses that travel on circumferential routes
around the central city and on inter-district routes. The system’s backbone comprising of the
Bus Rapid Transit, operate in 5 main axes through dedicated bus lanes that lead into the center
of the city. The cylindrical, see-through tube stations (bus stops) require passengers to pay
their fares as they enter the stations similar to subway stations, making the transaction much
faster and safer.
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Lessons Learned
Brazil’s experience on phasing out subsidies consisted of a series of policies adopted and
implemented throughout a 2-decade period. Brazil’s success was largely due to the gradual
approach in implementing subsidies removal. In order to build public support for the reform,
and avoid strong opposition from interest groups, subsidies that benefitted politically weak
stakeholders were removed first, while the politically more difficult were removed last.
Targeted social programs, including conditional cash transfer programs and the gas voucher,
have also helped compensate for the increase of certain products after prices have been
liberalized. In terms of public acceptance, liberalization reforms have more chance to succeed
under a popular government.
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The Case of Bolivia
Background
Although Bolivia exports ample amounts of natural gas, the country does not produce enough
crude oil for internal consumption. Bolivia, as a net importer of fuels, has had to spend great
amounts of public resources to import gasoline and diesel and subsidize them to make them
cheaper for consumers. In 2010, the total oil production was 47,877 barrels of oil per day,
while daily consumption was of 54,353 barrels per day (U.S. Energy Information Administration,
2012). In addition to the expense that these subsidies mean, Bolivia also copes with the loss of
fossil-fuels due to the smuggling across borders into Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil, and
Argentina, where consumer prices are between two and three times higher than in Bolivia.
Objectives of the Reform
Bolivian president, Evo Morales, justified the increase of fuel prices by capitalizing on the fact
that fuel prices in neighboring countries were even higher than the new non-subsidized fuel
prices in Bolivia. Figure 5 shows diesel and super gasoline prices for Bolivia and its neighboring
countries as well as Bolivia’s fuel prices post-decree. However, according to journalist Maria
Julia Osorio from El Tiempo, minimum wage and the average income, in neighboring countries
is anywhere from 1.5 to 4 times higher than in Bolivia (Osorio, 2011). Figure 6 shows GDP per
capita based on purchasing power parity for Bolivia and neighboring countries.
Attempting a Phase-Out
On December 26, 2010, the Bolivian government approved Decree 748 to remove the existing
subsidies on gasoline and diesel and bring the prices to the international market prices; a
political move Bolivians called el gasolinazo. The prices for these commodities increased
immediately anywhere from 57 to 83 percent, which is higher than the stipulated gradual 10%increment (GIZ, 2010). Premium gasoline went from 3,74 bolivianos (54 US cents) per liter to
6,47 bolivianos (93 US cents) per liter, and diesel went from 3,72 bolivianos (53 US cents) per
liter to 6,80 bolivianos (98 US cents) per liter (Osorio, 2011). These price increments were of 73
and 83 percent respectively.
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Figure 5 Comparison of Premium Gasoline and Diesel Prices (as of November 2010)
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Figure 6 Regional GDP per Capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP)
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The high prices that went into effect during the Christmas holidays lasted roughly a week due to
heavy protests, strikes, and riots that resulted from the increment. On December 27-28,
teachers and bus drivers held strikes that lead to some riots. The mitigation measures adopted
by president Morales were announced after the reform had gone into effect and the prices for
the fossil fuels had increased. The mitigation measures included a twenty-percent wage
increase for state employees and increase of minimum wages.
Although Bolivia has had the third lowest fossil fuel prices in South America, after
Ecuador and Venezuela, fuel prices are the highest in the region when compared with the
average income. Figure 6 shows a comparison of regional GDP per Capita, based on purchasing
power parity.
Transportation Sector
In October 2010, two months prior to the reform, the government established the Executing
Agency of CNG Conversion scheme (EEC-GNV), an agency exclusively responsible for converting
gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles to natural gas-powered vehicles free-of-charge.
Additionally, the agency also oversees other programs related to the maintenance and
regulation of compressed natural gas or CNG technology (EEC-GNV, 2013). Such programs
ideally aim to cut consumption of diesel, gasoline and LPG in order to decrease the
government’s expenditures regarding these fuels’ subsidies (EEC-GNV, 2013). The first phase of
this program involves the transformation of vehicles in the public sector (i.e. public
transportation). The program became available for private vehicles in November 2012 (EECGNV, 2013).
Given that Bolivia is a big producer and exporter of natural gas, these programs are
certainly positive steps towards getting rid of the inefficient subsidies on imported fossil-fuels13
(i.e. gasoline and diesel). However, the fact that the free conversion program was only adopted
a few months before the reform meant that only 3,450 publicly owned vehicles14 (out of 86,822
vehicles) were converted by the time the reform was implemented (EEC-GNV, 2013). As
consequence, the majority of public transportation vehicle operators were highly affected by

13

Although the dependence on subsidized natural gas could certainly create a new set of problems, decreasing the
consumption of diesel and gasoline would factually reduce loss since the government currently has to import these
products—paying market price—to then subsidize them for consumers at the pump.
14
It is important to note that publicly owned vehicles include urban mass transit (i.e. cars, microbuses, minibuses,
omnibuses, and jeeps) and cargo transportation vehicles (i.e. light-duty, medium-duty, and heavy-duty trucks) and
do not include privately owned and operated mass transit units, which in many developing countries can account
for up to 50% of public transportation.
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the increases of diesel and gasoline prices. Thus, these programs were not implemented early
enough to help mitigate the increase of diesel and gasoline prices.
Thirty percent (around 300,000 vehicles) of Bolivia’s 2011 automotive fleet (1,082,979
vehicles) currently runs as natural gas vehicles. Bolivia’s fleet has been undergoing conversions
to NGV technology since 2000 (NGV Journal, 2013; Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2011).
These costly conversions were done at the expense of the driver, which discouraged most to
switch. From October 2010 to December 2012 the government’s free program has converted
40,624 public and government-owned vehicles to Gas Natural Vehicles or GNVs (EEC-GNV,
2013). Additionally, Hernán Vega, the director of the EEC-GNV program, has said that of the
15,000 vehicles that have been converted in 2013, 60% corresponds to the private sector while
the remaining corresponds to the public sector (EEC-GNV, 2013).
Previous to the attempted fossil-fuel phase-out reform, Bolivia did not pursue major
investments in transportation infrastructure or public transit. Like in Venezuela, the country’s
major cities have a mix of public and private bus operators that lack integration and
organization. The failure of the reform, due in large part to the strike from the transportation
sector, has encouraged the government to pursue transportation improvement projects that
will support a future phase-out of gasoline and diesel subsidies. Bolivia has taken steps into
bettering the transportation fleet as a means to make people less dependent on gasoline and
diesel. Since Bolivia has the second largest reserves of natural gas in Latin America, Evo
Morales’ government invested in 2,000 compressed natural gas (CNG) buses from China in an
effort to decrease the consumption—and intrinsic costs—of subsidized diesel. These buses are
part of a plan to renew the fleet in the cities of La Paz and El Alto, two neighboring cities in
Bolivia that see experience a lot of commute between them.
Lessons Learned
Bolivia’s attempt to phase out fossil fuel (particularly gasoline) subsidies, exemplifies the
disastrous results of a poorly planned and implemented reform. The phase-out reform in Bolivia
presented major challenges due in large part to the lack of transparency on price regulations
and the lack of information given to the public previous to the implementation of the reform.
Not only were the price increases poorly communicated to the public, but also the reform was
announced in a very short notice, which created a lot of confusion and tension. The plan failed
because of a lack of plan to phase out systematically and gradually. Instead, policies were
adopted and implemented in a very short period of time without much regard to the
macroeconomic conditions of the country. Another obstacle to the reform had to do with its
high politicization. The government was deeply involved in discussions of price levels, which
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together with the lack of transparency on the specifics of the fossil-fuel new prices really fueled
the distrust of opposition constituents and transportation union leaders.
However, the Bolivian government was able to learn from its mistakes and adopted
measures that would help lower the consumption of gasoline and diesel. Bolivia encouraged
the switch to natural gas vehicles (NGVs) through a government-sponsored program.

Case Studies Summary

The case studies investigated above illustrate various fossil fuel subsidies phase-out reforms,
and their different levels of success. Table 6 showcases a comparative summary of the three
Case Studies: Brazil, Bolivia, and Iran.
Brazil’s experience on phasing out subsidies consisted of a series of policies adopted and
implemented throughout a 2-decade period. The country’s success was largely due to the
gradual approach in implementing subsidies removal. However, more recently, Brazil’s
experience also reveals that a lack of public transportation investment prior to and during the
reform can be problematic in the long run. As evidenced by last month’s protests, increasing
fares of a poor-quality public transportation system can be very controversial, especially in
cities of the developing world where public transportation accounts for most of the daily trips.
Vasconcellos (2005) agrees that most cities in Brazil have lagged behind in public transportation
investment because most investments prior to and during the reform were geared towards
roadways expansion and construction, which primarily incentivizes the use of the private
automobile. Although infrastructure investment is important, Brazilian cities would have
benefited greatly if they would have followed Curitiba’s transportation oriented development
style through the use of the cost-effective Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) and the integration of land
use and transportation planning.
Iran’s fossil fuel subsidies phase-out reform narrative is still in the writing, therefore, it is
hard to assess whether or not it has been completely successful. The literature suggests that
Iran began to think about the importance of public transportation in the early 2000s. In fact,
around the time the government implemented the program to ration gasoline and diesel, Iran
inagurated its first BRT line in Tehran, which today counts with six lines. In 2007, the
government also passed a law requiring the government to invest on public transportation as
well as to increase the level of public transit dependency from 41% to 70%. The reform itself
also took the transportation sector into account by allowing either subsidized gasoline or semisubsidized diesel for vehicles in the agricultural and industrial sector as well as for public
transportation. Plan reform and educate, communicate and advocate.
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Bolivia although unsuccessful at phasing-out, has adopted new measures in order to
decrease diesel and gasoline consumption; thus, making it easier for a future subsidies phaseout. The parliament has approved a government-led program that encourages the switch to
natural gas vehicles. By investing in better and more efficient technologies, Bolivia hopes to
minimize the consumption of—and the nation’s expenditures on—the imported fuels it
currently subsidizes and instead encourage the use of its natural resource.
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Table 5 Case Studies Summary Table

Policy

Brazil
• (1988) Constitution establishes energy
resources must be subject to competitive
licensing.
• (1994) Austerity measures are adopted
through "Plan Real."
• (1997) Law No. 9,478 allows other
companies into Brazil's oil and gas industry,
deregulating it. Petrobras monopoly ends.
• (1997-2000) Elimination of price regulation
of crude oil and oil products.
• Reform included prices for: petroleum
derivatives such as kerosene, diesel,
gasoline, LPG, asphalt, residuals; and other
fuels such as ethanol.

Iran
• (2007) Electronic card for gasoline and
diesel rationing.
• (2007) Public Transportation
Development and Fuel Consumption
Management Law.
• (2010) Targeted Subsidies Reform Act
adopted in January and implemented in
December.
• Reform included prices for: petroleum
derivatives (i.e. diesel, gasoline, LPG,
kerosene, fuel oil), services (i.e. water,
electricity, postal, air, and rail), and food
items

Bolivia
• October (2010) Decree 675 establishes
EEC-GNV for the conversion of
gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles
into GNC-powered vehicles.
• (2010) Decree 748 removes Gasoline
and Diesel subsidies.
• Reform included only diesel and
gasoline prices.

Timing

1990-2002 (Gradual approach)

2010-2015 (Gradual approach)

2010 (Instantaneous approach)

Level of Success

Successful implementation of phase-out.
Note that current events (protest) indicate
public transit investment prior to and during
the reform might be necessary.

Successful implementation of phase-out.

Not successful; decree annulled after a
week of protests and riots from the
public transportation sector.

Communications

• Successful public relations campaign,
included workshops and meetings to
educate major stakeholders and
population on the growing costs of low
energy prices.
• Extensive publicity in the media.
• Households were exposed to new prices
before the reform through subsidized,
semi-subsidized and free-market prices
for fossil fuels and services in gas
stations and monthly receipts to
familiarize the population.
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• No public relations campaign or any
kind of public meetings to educate
stakeholders and the population of the
benefits of phasing-out subsidies.
• Process lacked planning and
transparency.

Brazil
• During reform there was minimum transit
investment; most transportation policies
and investments were geared towards
roadway construction and expansion.

Iran
• Since the early 2000s, public
transportation investment has been a
primary goal.
• (2007) First BRT in operation.
• (2010) Expansion of capital's BRT and
implementation of a bike rental
program.
• (2010-2013) Subway constructions in 2
major cities; and a third one has been
recently approved to get a Metro.

None Available

Subsidized gasoline rates (1,000 IRR/L)
held for governmental vehicles in the
industrial and agricultural sectors. Semisubsidized gasoline rates (4,000 IRR/L)
held for domestic vehicles with engine
<2L. And semi-subsidized diesel price
(1,500 IRR/L) held for public
transportation.

Urban
Infrastructure and
Transit Investment

Transportation
Aspect of Reform
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Bolivia
• No major investment went into public
transportation. Conversions to CNG
were expected to reduce gasoline and
diesel consumption and mitigate the
impact of higher fuel prices; however,
only 3,450 public transport vehicles
around the country were converted by
the time the reform went into effect.
• January (2011) government invests in
2,000 CNG buses from China.
• December (2012), 40,520 vehicles had
been converted to CNG vehicles
through the free-of-charge program
established by the government.
None Available

IV. Pre-Reform Phase
Regardless of political party affiliations, politicians in Venezuela agree that a phase-out of fossil
fuels, especially to gasoline and diesel, is necessary. Subsidies to fossil fuels are not only
detrimental to the environment in the long run, but they also encourage wasteful consumption
and across-the-border smuggling, facilitate driving, and aggravate traffic congestion. While a
general understanding and consensus has been reached about the issue of cheap gasoline and
diesel, concrete measures have not been taken due to the possible negative reactions that a
reform to raise prices might generate among citizens. Therefore in this section I explore a set
of opportunities and threats to a fossil fuel phase out and also offer a few thoughts on how to
prepare the country for a successful reform.
Opportunities
Venezuelan Patrimony Fund and Household Transfers
While fossil-fuel subsidies primarily benefit upper-income people, a sharp increase of fossil fuel
prices can have significant repercussions on poor households’ budgets. Therefore, in-kind
mitigation measures are necessary to ensure that the phase-out reform does not result in
increased poverty.
Pedro Luis Rodriguez15 and his father Luis Roberto Rodriguez, propose limiting the
Executives’ discretion in deciding how to use petrodollars, while giving citizens a share of the
revenues through the creation of the Venezuelan Patrimony Fund. The idea is to make citizens
true owners of the national patrimony by distributing oil revenue cash equally among citizens.
The fund would work as a savings fund, where all the oil revenue is deposited instead of going
to the State’s account—FONDEN, FISCO. Every Venezuelan, 18 years old and order, would be
entitled to have a trust account within this fund. Citizens would directly contribute to the State
by paying a certain tax on the income. This would truly mean that citizens are direct
beneficiaries from and owners of the oil rent, as well as responsible contributors to the
government and economy. The remaining on each account would be divided into short-term
expenses for health, education, and public transportation; as well as for long-term plans such as
pensions.

15

Professor at the International Center of Energy and the Environment (CIEA) at the Institute of Advanced Studies
in Administration (IESA).
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According to the authors, if this fund would have been implemented in 1997, with a 50%
tax over the oil revenues, each beneficiary would have saved around $14,000 (Rodríguez &
Rodríguez, 2013). Additionally to this, citizens would be entitle to access an universal health
insurance valued at an estimate of $900, based on the popular health system (Sistema Popular
de Salud). Even today, if the total net revenue were distributed among all citizens—including
children—each citizen would receive $3,000 a year (Rodríguez & Rodríguez, 2013).
Threats to a successful Phase-Out implementation
The Bolivia case study and historical events like El Caracazo suggest that public opinion can
have a powerful influence on the success of a fossil-fuel phase-out reform. Increases of
gasoline and diesel prices lead to an increment of prices for other goods and services because
the energy that it takes to make, process, or transport these goods is no longer subsidized.
To successfully implement a fossil fuel subsidies phase-out reform, the Venezuelan
government must establish open dialogue with the opposition. Given the recent presidential
elections and critical political situation in Venezuela, it is necessary that the government
establish a healthy dialogue with the portion of the country—49.12% according to the country’s
National Electoral Council (CNE)—that does not support the current government. Distrust in
the government and public institutions would be detrimental for a major policy and could
eventually lead to a Caracazo. Moreover, in a country as politicized and divided as Venezuela, it
would be more favorable that the government focuses on rationalizing the reform based on a
formula and monitored by experts in the matter to create a larger base of supporters, instead
of politicizing the reform.
Additionally, it is also very important that the government stabilizes the economy, by
stabilizing the exchange rate to limit inflation. At the moment it is estimated that inflation this
year will be at 60%, which of course makes this first step very difficult. An increase in gas prices
would undoubtedly impact public transportation as well as the transportation of goods and
services, which could in turn jack up inflation rates. Another economic measure required would
be the stabilization of basic staples and consumer goods prices through administrative policies.
Lastly, educating the public about the benefits of a phase-out reform is an important
step to gaining the public’s acceptance. In Iran, the reform was successful partly because the
reform had a large media coverage and education campaigns highlighting the social benefits
and compensation packages long before the reform was ever adopted. In contrast, Bolivia’s
case illustrates that the lack of information about the implications of the reform created
distrust among the citizens, who protested until it was reversed.
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V. Transportation Infrastructure Investment Plan
Part of the reason for the strong public resistance to any increase in gasoline prices is the fact
that the transportation system has increasingly relied on the fact that gasoline is very cheap,
and important infrastructure has been neglected over the years for the sake of supporting the
price controls. Therefore, strengthening and investing in public transportation in Venezuela is
essential to gaining public support for the reform. The key is in making public transit and nonmotorized modes of transportation a convenient option. In this section I will discuss the
opportunities that present themselves to urban and transportation planners in shaping the
country’s future approach toward transportation.
Mobility
Mobility measures the number of trips people in a determined system or space make. This
measurement includes time, space, and the reasons for traveling. A transportation system
provides the means, structures, and services needed to access goods, other services, activities
and places. Urban mobility studies and policies include three aspects: sustainability,
accessibility and social inclusion.
In Latin America, urban mobility policies must take into consideration the high levels of
inequality and informality that exist in urban spaces as a whole. In other words, urban mobility
policies should not only be about sustainable transportation, but they should include land-use
actions.
At the urban planning level, Vasconcellos (2005) suggests that structural actions need to
focus on two objectives: 1) Accessibility and Equity; and 2) Environment and Energy. The first
objective consists of humanizing the urban space by redistributing road space, supporting nonmotorized and public transportation modes, and limiting the automobile. The second objective
involves reducing distances and the use of motorized transport by adopting and implementing
land-use and density policies that support non-motorized (i.e. walking and biking) and public
transport. This approach realizes a profound transformation of the space both physically and
functionally; the reconfiguration of the city and its activities and the change of travel patterns.
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Urban Form
Venezuela, with a 94.9% urban population, has become one of the most urbanized countries in
Latin America (United Nations-Habitat, 2007). Caracas’ urbanized area—consisting of 261km2 of
777km2—has a population density of 12,030 people/km2, higher than the largest cities in
Europe, and far greater than some of the largest cities in Latin America, with a few exceptions
that include Bogotá (14,755 people/km2) and some other Colombian cities (Corporación Andina
de Fomento (CAF), 2010). In comparison to Asian cities, Caracas shares a similar density with
Kolkata (12,100 people/ km2) and slightly overpasses the densities of Delhi (11,800 people/
km2) and Seoul-Incheon (10,600 people/ km2). However, mostly Asian cities rank higher than
Venezuela (151) as some of the most urbanized areas by population density (DEMOGRAPHIA,
2013) (See also Reducing automobile dependence by Peter Newman, for density indicators of
other Asian cities).
Caracas became a center of attraction for rural dwellers and foreign investors in the
1950s due to dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez’s “progressive capitalist mode of production”
(Brillembourg, Feireiss, & Klumpner 2005, p.73). Caracas became the most prosperous city in
Latin America with some of the most modern infrastructure. The subsequent oil boom of the
60s and 70s that gave Venezuela 15% of the world’s oil market exacerbated the exodus into the
capital, resulting in an unorganized and rapid demographic growth (Brillembourg, Feireiss, &
Klumpner, 2005).
In “Fragmented Urban Topographies and Their Underlying Interconnections,” Saskia
Sassen defines the two extreme modes in the configuration and appropriation of urban space in
cities of the South as “the corporate complex” and “informal city” (Sassen 2005, p. 84). Caracas
very well exemplifies this divisive, very contrasting urban space. On the one hand, the
demographic shift forty years ago was evident by the apparition and expansion of informal
settlements or shantytowns that lacked proper public infrastructures (i.e. roads, pedestrian
amenities, sewerage, electricity). And on the other hand, formal residences were expanding to
the west of Caracas in areas closer to–and in fact within—the urban core with access to public
services and infrastructure.
Currently, from the 3.2 million people that live in Metropolitan Caracas, more than 50
percent live in slums or barrios located on the periphery (United Nations-Habitat, 2007). The
barrios’ informal architecture, known as arquitectura buhonera16 constitutes fifty percent of
Caracas’ built environment (IRIN and UN-HABITAT, 2007). The division of the urban form
referred to by Sassen is exacerbated by the lack of coordination between urban land-use,
16

Arquitectura Buhonera takes its name after imitating the informal commerce that commonly known buhoneros,
or street hawkers, practice all over the capital (Eulich, 2010).
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traffic, and transport planning. Barrio dwellers endure very rough living conditions due to
poorly maintained and missing infrastructure, high crime rates, a lack of public open spaces,
and the amateur nature of housing construction.
When it comes to the placement of investments or use of public money, there are
increasing concerns about equity issues. Historically in developing countries, transport and
urban land use policies tend to benefit the middle and upper classes, while often excluding and
isolating the poorest in inadequate places. Although the Chavez’s regime and his successor
have made some efforts to provide services for the low-income inside the barrios through the
Misión Barrio Adentro and Misión Robinson, these programs offer very low quality services and
often lack both material and human resources.
Transportation and Economic Development
The literature suggests that transportation infrastructure investment affects economic growth.
A study by John Fernald explains that construction of the interstate highway system in the
United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s boosted productivity. The results highlight that
the construction boom stimulated by public investment, “contributed about 1 percentage point
more to productivity growth before 1973 than after” (Fernald 1999, p. 620). Furthermore,
industries that use roads intensively or are vehicle-intensive benefit more and are more
productive. The author found causation from public capital to productivity. In another study,
Wolassa Kumo found a strong two-way causal relationship between infrastructure investment
and public sector employment reflecting on the job creation as a result of construction,
maintenance, and the operational activities of infrastructure building (Kumo, 2012).
Another economic benefit from investing in the expansion of infrastructure includes a
more efficient transportation of goods and services at a lower cost, which results in lower
prices for consumers. This is due to businesses depending on a well-functioning infrastructure
system to obtain supplies and deliver goods and services at a profitable price. Similarly,
investing in public transit has also shown to promote economic investment in the areas
adjacent to public transit routes as they become more accessible to the public. In a study
conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Office on Bus Rapid Transit, showed that
local officials believe BRT projects contribute to local economic development and investment
(United States Government Accountability Office, 2012). Efficient public transit also increases
property values and brings businesses near them.
Many underdeveloped countries have used privatization as a way to fix public services.
However, some developing countries have relied on governmental intervention to generate
efficient and low-cost solutions to public transit. One cost-effective solution that has gained a
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lot of support among developing countries is the implementation of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT).
Bus Rapid Transit offers the benefits of light rail with the flexibility and efficiency of bus transit.
The goal of a BRT system is to enhance ridership while reducing costs. BRT systems combine
intelligent transportation systems technology, cleaner and quieter vehicles, convenient and
safe fare collection methods, traffic signal priority, and integration with land use.
The Caraqueños: A Divided Society
Transportation Infrastructure
One of the earliest and most important contributions of the oil rent was without a doubt the
modernization of the country, in particular that of Caracas. In the late 1940s, renowned New
York’s chief planner and master builder, Robert Moses, who spearheaded the program of
highways throughout the United States, developed Caracas’ highway system (Brillembourgh,
Feireiss, & Klumpner, 2005). The resulting highway plan was directed at improving accessibility
for private transport, while public transportation and multi-modal transport options were
disregarded. At the time, the United States’ highway system launched during the Eisenhower
administration embodied the model and ideal for prosperity and “good government” to the
developing world (Brillembourg, Feireiss, & Klumpner 2005, p.75). With Venezuela’s oil boom in
the 1950s, Moses network of highways irreversibly and haphazardly fragmented the city,
isolating low-income communities in less desirable areas, changing the landscape of the city,
and influencing the different living environments.
Currently pedestrian infrastructure is non-existent in some areas and bike infrastructure
is non-existent for the most part. Out of 2,758 km of roadways, there is clear pedestrian
priority on a total of 2.2 km of roads, and 14 km of bike lane in the whole Metropolitan region
(CAF, 2010). Furthermore, as many other businesses in the country, Venezuela’s transportation
infrastructure and services have undergone an extensive wave of nationalization largely due to
its bad condition. The central government nationalized many roads, ports, airports, as well as
the largest ferry company in the country—Conferry—under the pretext that private companies
and local governments were not successfully managing and solving their own problems;
problems that have resulted from the current economic conditions in Venezuela (The
Economist, 2011). Some of the most notorious issues in the transportation sector include
engines falling off jet planes; “mega-holes” in the middle of major roads large enough to
swallow an entire car; commuter trains colliding; ferry delays and cancellations; as well as
traffic congestion in Caracas and main cities due to highways that are over capacity.
Though the fleet of motor vehicles has doubled in the past ten years, the infrastructure
to support it has remained largely unchanged and minimally invested in. As a result of
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deteriorated roadways and unexpanded infrastructure, traffic congestion has worsened
becoming a major headache in the capital and other major cities in Venezuela. The average
commute time for private vehicles in Caracas is 43 minutes, which easily doubles for out-oftowners that commute daily into the city for work.
In 2012, the government spent BsF. 5.48 billions ($870 million)17—about 1.8% of GDP—
in transportation projects (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias, 2011). This is a very small
investment to an infrastructure system built over more than fifty years ago. According to the
fiscal budget for 2013, the government will spend approximately BsF. 13.362 billions ($2.12
billion18) in transportation projects, 3.4% of the projected GDP (Chavez Frias, 2012). Accounting
for inflation, this represents an increase of 76.3 % in transportation investment in real terms; a
long-time needed step up on infrastructure maintenance, repair, and expansion for sure.
Infrastructure issues affect the country as a whole, but can be most noticeable in
Caracas, where over capacity roads, evidenced by the use of the shoulder lane as another traffic
lane, contribute to major traffic jams. In 2012 it was reported that Caracas’ road network has
remained practically the same since the 1950s. Caraqueños (Caracas residents) and those
commuting from towns in the vicinity spend an average of one hour and a half in morning
traffic, which averages to 720 hours annually (Globovision, Casos de Investigacion, 2011). Yet
set in a narrow valley, wedged between mountains, Caracas’ road capacity is very limited which
makes expansion an unlikely solution to the congestion problem.
Public Transit in Caracas
Experiences show that “major cities in developing countries are important examples of conflicts
in the planning process,” due to their failure to efficiently integrate or coordinate urban,
transportation and traffic policies and planning (Vasconcellos, 2005). Caracas exemplifies this
lack of transportation and land-use integration primarily because of institutional differences
and regulatory weaknesses. The number of institutions responsible for urban and transport
issues at the local, regional, and federal level presents challenges for major cities in Latin
America. Like in Brazil, in Venezuela metropolitan authorities do not have “real” legal power;
therefore, it is difficult to reach an agreement over a common transportation project for a
metropolitan area that comprises several cities administered by different political parties
(Vasconcellos, 2005).

17
18

Parallel dollar: $181 million.
Parallel dollar: $441 million.
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Institutions and Governing Bodies
The Metropolitan District of Caracas (MDC)
has a population of 3,220,540 people and is
divided into five municipalities: El
Libertador in the Capital District; and Sucre,
Coche, El Hatillo, and Baruta in the state of
Miranda. Each of the municipalities is
governed by its own Mayor. The
Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas oversees all
the different Municipality Mayors. Recently,
due to political differences between the
Metropolitan Mayor and the national
government, the National Assembly created
a new position that assumed power over
most functions, funding, and personnel that
was previously held by the Metropolitan
Mayor.

Figure 7 The Metropolitan District of Caracas

Source: Alcaldia Metropolitana de Caracas.

In Venezuela, public transportation is a responsibility of both the national and local
governments. La Ley de Tránsito y Transporte Terrestre (The Law of Ground Transit and
Transport) (2008) assigned the National Government the responsibility of transportation
policymaking through El Ministerio del Poder Popular para Transporte Terrestre (Ministry of the
Popular Power of Ground Transport), and transferred the responsibilities to authorize, regulate,
supervise, and control urban public transportation services to each municipality (Asamblea
Nacional, 2008). Municipalities grant bus owners or operators the permits to operate on a
determined route at a determined schedule and are responsible of regulating that the terms
are met. In practice, however, there is no proper regulation; thus, operators frequently do not
carry out their routes properly, skipping stops, and disregarding frequency. The por puestos, for
instance, run without a set schedule and usually during peak hours, when there is higher
demand, which exacerbates congestion (as cited in Lizarraga, 2011)
Due to the complexity of the government power structure and the fragmentation of the
regulatory system, coordination of the metropolitan transit system as well as the provision of
reliable routes and times information becomes very difficult. Moreover, political differences
between a local or municipal government and the central government negatively impact the
former, as the latter tends to undermine actions taken by opposition leaders. Therefore, some
of the opposition mayors and governors have a harder time implementing their transportation
measures. For instance, in 2009, Henrique Capriles Radonsky, governor of the state of
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Miranda—which comprises about half of Caracas—launched a traffic calming technique known
as Pico y Pala (Peak and Plate) on one of the main arterial routes into the city. The idea behind
the scheme, which has had some success in countries like Brazil and Colombia, was to restrict
cars with certain license plates from circulating certain days. The plan met resistance from the
central government, who ruled the measure to be “unconstitutional” because it restricted
people’s right to freedom of movement. Since constitutional rights technically apply to the
individual (and not his or her possessions), the decision of the Supreme Court granted
automobiles constitutional rights.
Mobility, Motorization and Transportation Modes
Caracas has one of the highest rates of motorization in the Latin American region (261 vehicles
per 1,000 people), higher than the median in the country (146 vehicles/1,000 people) (CEPAL,
2009). From 1990 to 1998 the fleet of motor vehicles grew by only 4.4%, while from 1998 to
2008, the fleet of motor vehicles grew by 113%, going from 2,441,000 vehicles to 5,218,940
vehicles (Ramirez, 2012). The Society of Venezuelan Civil Engineers has said that 60% of the
vehicles sold annually in the country are used in the Caracas Metropolitan District (as cited in
Lizarraga, 2011). Gasoline subsidies make it relatively low-cost having a car and encourage
motorized vehicle purchases. Although automobiles per capita have often been used as an
index to measure both growth and productivity of countries, the measurement alone can be
deceiving, as it is the case in Venezuela.
A report by the Cámara de Fabricantes Venezolanos de Productos Automotores
(FAVENPA)19 breaks down Venezuela’s 2011-fleet of motor vehicles into the following: 61.6%
passenger vehicles, 18.8% four-wheel drive vehicles or 4x4, 10.1% light commercial vehicles,
6.9% medium commercial vehicles, 1.3% buses and minibuses, and 1.3% heavy commercial
vehicles (Ramirez, 2012). Close to twenty-eight percent of the fleet is considered obsolete,
dangerous, and highly polluting, being more than 16 years old; and another 16.5% of the fleet is
11-15 years old fast approaching the obsolete category (Ramirez, 2012).

19

Chamber of Venezuelan Auto-parts Manufacturers.
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Figure 8 Trip Distribution by public transit type in
In terms of mobility, a 2010Caracas, 2005
study by El Observatorio de Movilidad
Urbana (OMU) shows that most trips in
Caracas are done through public transit
(54.4%), while private vehicles
constitute 27.2% of the total trips (CAF,
2010). More importantly however, is
the fact that most trips (46.53%) on
public transit are done using the
informal transportation system or the
privately operated por puestos—
described in more detail below—which
are not integrated to the more efficient
and reliable system that exist in the city
(Alcaldia Metropolitana de Caracas,
2005). The second most frequent mode
Source: Alcaldia Metropolitana de Caracas, 2005
of public transit is the Metro system,
with 24.39% of the daily trips. Figure 8 shows the trip distribution by public transit type. In
addition, pedestrians and bicyclists only account for 18.4% combined, which is 10 points below
the median of the fifteen Latin American cities studied by OMU. The low levels of walking and
biking are attributable to the lack of pedestrian and bicyclist infrastructure and amenities
throughout the city. Aside from the lack of structural infrastructure, most public transportation
vehicles (from the private or public sector) are not equipped to hold bicycles for intermodal
transfers.

In terms of the supply of public transportation in Caracas, the fleet is very diverse and
reaches a great level of informality. The deregulation and privatization of collective
transportation in the 1970s led to the emergence of a disorganized and disarticulated on-thesurface collective passenger transport, currently serviced by 269 private operators20 and 2
public operators (CAF, 2011). The collective passenger transport has a total fleet of 17,000
vehicles and runs 514 different routes (CAF, 2011).
Private operators hold the largest share of the service. Their vehicle fleet is unsafe
because these tend to be very old and in very poor conditions. In addition, these vehicles often
service without proper regulation and control. The drivers of private operators endure unfair
working conditions without a fixed salary, benefits or insurance (Lizarraga, 2011). The city’s
20

Private operators are cooperatives or civil associations of minibus, microbus, and jeep
owners.
46

private operators include buses, por puestos and rústicos. Por puestos (which literally translates
to “by the seat”) can be anything from a 5-seater Ford Ltd 1967 to minibuses/microbuses with a
capacity of 18-32 seats. Rústicos are 4x4 jeeps that operate in areas that are hard to access due
to difficult terrain and poor road infrastructure; primarily used for trips up to the shantytowns
in Caracas.
Privately owned collective transportation like the rústicos and the por puestos present a
number of issues. Among the most notable is traffic congestion. There is an excessive number
of informal buses in the streets, which exacerbate traffic congestion and pollute the
atmosphere; the latter due to the fact that most vehicles are very old and inefficient. The
quality of service is low because buses do not belong to specific companies that pride
themselves on their unique service and experience.
These vehicles are also the most prone to crime since burglars take advantage of fare
collection not being automated or electronic and drivers having to handle the cash while
behind the wheel. The disorganization and disarticulation of the transit system aggravates
crime. The passengers are also target of these burglaries. In a lot of cases, robbers target larger
vehicles and often sweep the entire bus.
The local, regional, and national governments also provide public transportation. Among
the different municipalities within the MDC, one can observe differences in the operation and
organization of collective transit. For instance, the Municipality of Baruta authorizes municipal
and intermunicipal routes, regulates taxi companies, controls the conditions of terminals and
stops, and develops bus operator trainings for the municipal bus drivers (Alcaldia de Baruta,
2013). Similarly the Mayoralty of Chacao also prioritizes mobility, providing the municipality a
collective passenger transport system, TransChacao since 2008. The Metropolitan Mayoralty
also has established a public transit system by the name of TransMetrópoli with a fleet of 80
plus new-technology buses—with bike racks—that service 12 lines.
Aside from municipalities and local governments, there are agencies within the Central
Government whose responsibility is to provide public passenger transport services as well as to
maintain transportation infrastructure. Agencies of the Ministry of Ground Transport include
the Caracas Metro (Cametro), the Instituto de Ferrocariles del Estado (State Railways
Institution), and La Fundación Fondo Nacional de Transporte Urbano (FONTUR).
The Metropolitan District of Caracas’ public transportation network comprises three
systems: the underground rapid transit, the cable cars, and the collective passenger transport.
The underground rapid transit or metro, managed by CAMETRO, was inaugurated in 1983 as an
alternative to the car. The metro operates four active lines while two more are under
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construction. A network of buses (Metrobús) compliments the subway system since 1987 and
has an integrated ticketing system that allows easy transfers between the two public transit
options (Lizarraga, 2011). The Metrobús, consisting of 220 large buses, operates 29 urban and
suburban routes at a set schedule and frequency (Mundó, 2012). While the Metrobús does not
operate throughout the entire MDC, it connects the subway stations with kea areas in the city
and the outskirts. Since October 2012, line 7 of the Metro is operated by BusCaracas, a bus
rapid transit line with a fleet of 12 buses.
Public transit is an instrument of social inclusion and as such one of its functions is to
connect the barrios to the commercial areas where services and job opportunities are
concentrated (Lizarraga, 2011). More recently the Metrocable system has been added to the
Metro-Metrobús network. The metrocable consists of cable car lines that connect the
numerous barrios located along the mountainsides of Caracas to the closest Metrobús stations
in the periphery of the city.
Did you say BRT?
Bus Rapid Transit systems in Venezuela are relatively recent. The country currently has two BRT
systems in place, one in Caracas (BusCaracas) and the other one in the state of Mérida
(Trolmérida). A third BRT system (Transbarca) is currently under construction in Barquisimeto,
while two more systems are planned for Ciudad Guayana and San Cristóbal.
The BusCaracas system comprises a 5.5-Km pilot route, 11 stops, and 12 articulated
buses. Since it was launched in October 2012, bus drivers in charge of their privately owned bus
have complained that the new buses interfere with their own routes. In other words, the BRT
system has not been one that integrates with the different bus fleets on the roads, but instead
it competes for the same services being provided. The new BRT buses use an electronic pre-pay
method for students, which is not a feature that can be easily installed in some of the older
buses. Need to absorb the existing private operators. The BusCaracas was suspended for some
period of time this year due to the amount of people walking on the dedicated lanes.
SWOT Analysis of the BusCaracas system
Below, I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the new BusCaracas fleet as well as the
possible opportunities that could be expanded upon and threats to be on the lookout for.
Strengths:
•
•

BusCaracas implied lower costs and construction time than the subway alternative.
Fare prices are very low and reasonable. Fare prices are the same as in the nonBusCaracas public transportation vehicles: a single trip costs 1.5 BsF. (23 US cents); a
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•

•
•
•
•
•

two-way trip: 3 BsF. (47 US cents); and a pass for 10 trips cost 13 BsF. (2.06 US dollars)
(Ministerio del Poder Popular para Transporte Terrestre, 2012).
Offers a high quality and efficient service:
o Pre-board fare collection is safer for the bus drivers because they do not have to
manage transaction while behind the wheel. Additionally, pre-paying at the
station speeds up the process of entering the bus and shortens waiting time.
o Free transfers between the two corridors and ticket integration with the MetroMetrobús system makes transfers between the different modes much easier.
Restricted operator access.
BusCaracas’ entire fleet of buses are equipped for and accessible to people that have
disabilities.
Clean Bus technology that uses diesel instead of gasoline, which is more efficient. Also
the buses are newer and in better conditions than the old fleet.
Each bus can hold up to 160 passengers, twenty times more than the largest por
puestos, which represent 46.53% of the transit.
The trip along the corridor takes 35 minutes, half of the current average bus ride (67
minutes) (CAF, 2007).

Weaknesses:
•

•

•
•

•

From the inception of the project, one of the most prominent issues was at the
construction level. The project did not have a cohesive team throughout the
construction phase. In fact three different companies acquired the project at different
times. Therefore, the government’s assignment of responsibility seems to lack proper
evaluation of whether the parties involved in the construction are at all capable of
fulfilling these.
Changes in the leading institution without adequate and transparent explanation to the
pubic have affected the credibility of the government and the project. This specifically
raises the question of whether the State resources are being correctly allocated and
managed.
Though the system is now in operation, unfinished sections still remain evidenced by
many broken sidewalks and unpaved or unpatched roads.
Due to the narrow nature of the arterial road (Fuerzas-Armana Nueva Granada Avenue),
the project and design has had to be modified a number of times, reducing pedestrian
and public spaces and greatly hindering both pedestrian and private vehicle mobility.
Another weakness is the fact that traffic lanes were removed in order to dedicate them
to Bus Rapid Transit. This has aggravated the traffic situation in the two main ways
parallel to the bus way.
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•
•
•
•
•

Pedestrians walk on the dedicated bus way.
It is not a very large system; therefore its impact is not as great. BusCaracas only travels
through two corridors in the city center for a total of 5.2 Km (3 miles).
11 stations
Additionally, the system has not been integrated with the privately operated buses,
which represent a majority in the city.
Lack of Integration between Transportation and Land Use.

Opportunities:
•
•
•
•

If it were to be expanded, the BRT system could facilitate mobility along the whole
Metropolitan region.
Integrated Transit Network (RIT)
Investment in public transportation and the public space that accompanies it will benefit
property prices along the corridor.
Purchase new buses and encourage private operators to apply for credit lines to renew
their fleet.

Threats:
•

Public Transportation Unions fear of replacement and displacement by the new buses.
Historically, transportation unions—mostly representative of private operators—have
been very eloquent about the unsustainable and subsidized fare prices of the metro
system, as well as about more public transit competitiveness. It is essential that the
government work with them to make the system more robust.

Summary
Overall, the bus rapid transit in Caracas has not reached its full potential as a successful
transportation oriented development project. The system is not very large since it only travels
through two corridors for approximately 3 miles. In addition, the system has not been
integrated with the fleet of privately operated buses, which holds almost 50 % of the daily trips.
Due to the disorganized manner in which the project was handled, the system—now in
operation—still has unfinished sections, evidenced by many broken sidewalks and unpaved or
unpatched roads. The project and design has had to be modified a number of times at several
locations, reducing pedestrian and public spaces and greatly hindering both pedestrian and
private vehicle mobility.
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It is worth mentioning however, that although the system has presented some issues,
there are some advantages to investing in bus rapid transit. The BRT network implied lower
costs and construction time than the expansion of the subway alternative. Additionally, fare
prices are the same as the non-BusCaracas public transportation option, which entail the
provision of a higher quality and more efficient service for the same price. The service’s preboard fare collection speeds up the process of entering the bus, which shortens waiting time at
stops and transfer locations. Free transfers between the two corridors and ticket integration
with the Metro-Metrobús system makes transfers between the different modes much easier.
BusCaracas’ entire fleet of buses are equipped for and accessible to people that have
disabilities. The fleet’s technology is much more efficient and each BRT bus can hold up to
twenty times more passengers than the largest por puestos. Finally, the trip along the corridor
has shortened commuting times to 35 minutes, half of the current average bus ride (67
minutes) (CAF, 2007).
If the BRT system were to be expanded, it could facilitate mobility along the whole
metropolitan region. Additionally, investment in public transportation and the public space that
surrounds it would benefit property prices along the corridor and close to public transportation
lines. Something to keep in mind, however, is the fact that public transportation unions
represent a big threat—and historically have been vocally opposed—to BusCaracas because
private operators fear being replaced and displaced by the new publicly owned buses.
Historically, transportation unions have been very eloquent about the unsustainable and
subsidized fare prices of the metro system, as well as about better-quality public transit
competition. Therefore, it is essential that the Venezuelan government works with them to
make the whole system more robust and of a better quality.
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VI. Recommendations
Fossil fuel subsidies to consumers affect how people travel. In particular, they influence the
choice of transport mode. Due to the subsidies, a person can travel 300-400 miles in a private
automobile for approximately 1 USD in fuel costs. Or, the same person can take a single bus trip
for 23 US cents. Even ten bus trips at a discounted bus pass rate of USD 2.06 will not cover the
same distance that a car will be able to cover with just a single US dollar. The increase in fuel
prices caused by a phase-out reform of subsidies would certainly shock existing transportation
patterns. Transportation planners can and should therefore play a big role in how cities deal
with or react to the phase-out.
In this section I discuss several recommendations that relate to the transportation
system in Venezuela. While some of my recommendations are intended to address specific
issues arising due to the subsidy phase-out, it is also useful to point out more general
opportunities for improvement in the public transportation sector. Therefore, some of my
recommendations are not specific to a fossil fuel subsidy phase-out, but rather propose
improvements to the transportation system that may serve to ensure sustainable public
transportation in Venezuela in general. The case studies discussed above illustrate that in
addition to treating the specific symptoms caused by a fossil fuel phase-out, planners can help
reduce tensions and stress in individuals who find themselves forced to adapt to higher fuel
costs by ensuring a well-organized and well-planned public transportation system. Moreover,
the specific actions that address problems stemming from the subsidy phase-out require that
certain prerequisites are met. For example, education programs about public transportation
options are only useful if different transportation options are actually available in the first
place, and if it is possible to obtain information about these options in an organized fashion.
As a first step to make transportation options (and information about them) readily
available, it is necessary to integrate services. Service integration would support public
transportation and encourage multi-modal transportation instead of stimulating only motorized
transport. According to Vasconcellos (2005), service integration –which involves a citywide
route reorganization—can be offered in physical or financial forms. Physical integration refers
to the organization of space in which travelers or commuters may change between different
modes and services. Physical integration refers to the humanization of space through the
creation of more open spaces by expanding pedestrian priority ways and infrastructure as well
as bicycle infrastructure. Reclaim land along the BRT line to create more open spaces and
accessibility to pedestrians. Financial integration refers to combined ticketing (Vasconcellos,
2005).
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In Caracas, service integration would require the coordination of the publicly and privately
operated public transportation options through new transit technology like pre-board payment
and ticketing integration in all buses. Ongoing coordination and integration of transit services
can improve transportation system connectivity and reliability and help make transit a more
attractive mode alternative to the car. Service integration policies and practices that directly
impact commuters include infrastructure, fare payment and schedules. Infrastructure
integration in Caracas for instance would require changes to the route structure of transit
operators and the establishment of transfer centers that will facilitate the exchange between
different modes or within the same mode. Currently different operators compete for the same
routes at the same time, which increases congestion in the city. Increasing public transportation
availability without at the same time coordinating and integrating the different services
(offered by both public and private operators) would only increase the congestion problem.
Finally, schedule integration or the coordination of arrival and departure times would facilitate
the movement of transit customers.
Service integration would undoubtedly require the replacement of the old bus fleet with
new technology buses that run on electricity, diesel, natural gas, or bi-fuel. Today, most buses
in Caracas run on gasoline, which are less efficient, and more polluting than its bi-fuel, electric
or natural gas counterparts. The new fleet should have high occupancy to keep operational
costs as low as possible.

Education and Promotion Programs
Ignoring the cost of the car itself, driving in Venezuela is currently cheaper than riding public
transit. Fossil fuel subsidies have existed for a long time and the population is used to facing a
very low cost of driving. A phase-out reform of fuel subsidies would generate confusion and
discomfort among commuters because people do not trust or know any other options.
Commuters are not aware of efficient alternatives to their car. It is the planners’ job therefore
to educate the public and advocate for multi-modal transportation while in the process of fully
integrating the transportation network. As a ways to incentivize public transit ridership and
multi-modal transportation it is necessary that planners establish programs that emphasize
road safety and security for all type of commuters. Some of these programs include pedestrian
and bicyclist initiatives or workshops to promote walking and biking in the city.
Additionally, another way of promoting transit ridership would be through what David
Levinson from the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Minnesota calls “transit
system memberships”. This encourages those willing to pay for ‘unlimited services,’ instead of
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paying each time they use a service (Levinson, The case for (and against) public subsidy for
public transport, 2013). Levinson explains that reducing pass prices and raising individual fares
"At a relatively lower price, more people would get a Metropass. Possessing a Metropass would
induce me to make more trips by transit (since the marginal cost of use would now be zero)...
People pay for the option of not having to think about price" (Levinson, Club Transit, 2013). Yet,
the most important feature of this membership is the psychology behind it: the customer
becomes an owner of the transportation system and therefore as a member or owner, the
passenger now advocates for the service and maintains it. Similarly to museums and zoos,
membership should have perks in order to increase the perceived ownership that passengers
have for the service. For instance, joining the Caracas Transit System would get the passenger a
discount on the high-speed train (under construction) or ride for free in another city’s
transportation system for a week. This is especially important in the context of gasoline subsidy
phase-outs because at the moment consumers are psychologically most invested in their cars;
taking “ownership” of another mode of transportation will help change this mentality and
therefore make it easier to adapt to higher consumer fuel prices.

Transportation Policies during the Phase-Out
Although the decision making power regarding some aspects of a fossil fuel subsidies reform is
not in the hands of transportation planners, there are a number of policies that directly affect
transportation planning. Therefore transportation planners may play an important role in
educating decision makers, and planners may actively advocate those policies. The following
policies would play an important role in promoting public transportation infrastructure
investment and planning, as well as transit use:
I.

II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.

Implementation of a multi-tier pricing system for gasoline and diesel fuels by
adopting quotas for subsidized, semi-subsidized and free-market gasoline and diesel
prices.
Implementation of subsidized and semi-subsidized diesel prices for vehicles in the
agricultural and industrial sector and for public transportation.
Restriction of old public transportation fleet.
Implementation of government-sponsored programs that promote the switch to
better and cleaner technology (NGVs).
Implementation of the gasoline-rationing card across all states in the country,
beyond borderline states.
Gradual approach to phase-out is recommended. GIZ suggests that price increases
should be no more than 10%.
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A multi-tier pricing system in gasoline and diesel fuels would allow people that drive to
work to be more conscious about their consumption and be less wasteful. The idea is to reduce
private consumption and promote multi-modal trips. A policy like this will of course be more
efficient when paired with a strongly developed transportation network because people would
have more options on how to get to places.
Subsidized and semi-subsidized diesel prices for vehicles in the agricultural and
industrial sector would be ideal because that would keep prices of other goods and services
from going up. This scheme for the public transportation sector would mean that fare prices
could be maintained at low levels, encouraging the use of transit use. As demand for the service
rises, operational costs become lower.
Government-sponsored programs that promote the switch to better, newer, and
cleaner technologies (such as NGVs) would benefit the environment and allow for a decrease in
dependency on the more polluting fuels: gasoline and diesel. Given that Venezuela has the
eighth largest natural gas reserves in the world and that the natural resource is comparatively
cheaper to produce than the other two fuels, it is certainly worth considering—if not a
complete switch—encouraging bi-fuel or hybrid vehicles (Central Intellingence Agency, 2012).
Since funding often conditions project scope, it is essential that both the central and
local governments set new mechanisms to provide funding and grants for project
implementation. As cited by Vasconcellos in Urban Transport, Environment and Equity “the
alternative to poor subsidy policies is not a ‘no-subsidy policy’ but rather a more efficient one”
(Vasconcellos 2005, p.237). The idea is not to end fossil fuel subsidies, but to relocate them in
an equitable manner. Investing in an improved public transportation system will result in a
more equitable redistribution of nation resources, because – unlike highways—the poor are
also likely to benefit from improved public transportation.
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VII. Summary and Conclusion
Some individuals have long recognized the importance of investing oil rents into projects that
provide opportunities for long-run growth. The renowned Venezuelan intellectual and
journalist Arturo Uslar Pietri published an article in 1936 that explored the destructive
character of an economy completely dependent of a non-renewable natural resource (Uslar
Pietri, 1936). In his critique, Uslar Pietri coined the phrase “to sow the oil,” because he favored
investing oil rent into strengthening the agricultural sector and encouraging the use of modern
technology to industrialize farming. In his opinion it was most important to protect the
environment by repopulating the forests, building canals, and building dams that would
regulate irrigation. Uslar Pietri considered it imperative that the riches generated from the nonrenewable resource would be used to invest in a solid and progressive economy.
My suggestions attempt to capture the spirit of Uslar Pietri’s comments. Instead of
consuming the natural resource at an accelerated rate due to cheap prices, it is possible to
invest in an infrastructure to support public transit and multimodal transportation without the
need for extensive fossil-fuel price subsidies. Not only would investing in transportation
infrastructure help alleviate traffic congestion and reduce emissions, but it would also
humanize cities—in particular Caracas—becoming less vehicle-centric and more people-centric.
The long-term goal for the transportation network in Caracas is a citywide route
reorganization with full integration, which means the integration of the publicly and privately
operated public transportation options. The first step would be the replacement of the old fleet
with new technology buses and vehicles that run on electricity, diesel, or compressed gas. The
new fleet should have high occupancy to keep operational costs as low as possible. These
systems would be integrated through new transit technology like pre-board payment and
ticketing integration. In this process of reorganization, existing operators must be included in
the planning of new bus routes and feeder lines to mitigate opposition and conflicts.
The Brazil case study revealed that gradual implementation of a fossil-fuel phase-out
reform works best because the process is more controlled and each sector or group of
stakeholders that could be in opposition is dealt with carefully and separately. In contrast, the
Bolivian government, who adopted and implemented the reform in a very short period of time
without much regard or care of public opinion, faced very strong opposition and finally was
unsuccessful. Both the Bolivia and the Iran cases hint to the importance of informing the
masses in a transparent manner. The Iran case demonstrated that dealing with the public in an
informative and educational way from the planning stage to its implementation phase helps
ease the public into a phase-out reform. Iran’s success can also be attributed to how well the
56

government advertised the phase-out scheme and compensation package as necessary
measures to promote higher standards of living and minimize income inequalities.
In addition to the economic measures, Iran also focused on strengthening the country’s
public transportation infrastructure at least a decade before the implementation of the reform.
This was done in an effort to increase public-transit use, which is more inexpensive and uses
less energy per person than an automobile. We see that in the Bolivia case, the focus on
improving public transportation comes after the failure of the reform, as a way to also reduce
gasoline consumption. In Brazil, their experience shows that not all major cities had a cohesive
transportation system when the reform started to be implemented. However, we can assume
that if fossil fuels were still subsidized, Sao Paulo’s traffic would be much worse than it is now.
And as in the case of Bolivia, many Brazilian cities are now rushing to finish transportation
projects for the 2014 and 2016 international games.
Therefore, in order to be able to liberalize gasoline and diesel prices in the near future,
it is important that Venezuela invests in strengthening its public transportation network. More
importantly, the planning of urban spaces must be comprehensive; therefore, requiring the
integration of Land Use Planning, Transportation planning, and Traffic Planning. By humanizing
the urban landscape, cities would be less vehicle-centric and more people-oriented.
In addition to the above general recommendations that will improve the usability,
availability, and reliability of the public transportation system, there are also specific tasks that
planners face in facilitating the subsidy phase-out. In particular, municipalities should establish
campaigns and programs that emphasize road safety for all type of commuters through bicyclist
initiatives, bus drivers’ trainings, and workshops to educate and encourage public transit users.
This is necessary and particularly needed in Venezuela because the decades of very low fuel
prices have made consumers unaware of efficient alternatives to driving. It is important that as
changes to the shape of the city start occurring, individuals are knowledgeable about their
options and that they have all of the necessary information needed to change their mode of
transportation away from only personal automobiles.
Planners should also be vocal advocates of policies within the reform that will most
directly impact public transportation. For example, maintaining semi-subsidized fuel prices for
public transportation will be vital in order to maintain a low cost for public transit. Maintaining
multi-tier pricing system for some period of time at the beginning of the reform will also help
individuals familiarize themselves with alternatives to driving their own cars.
Since higher income individuals are less likely to change transportation modes in
response to the increased fuel prices, a scheme such as Levinson’s transit-system membership
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with perks may be implemented by transportation agencies. This creates a sense of ownership
in the public system and replaces the strong sense of ownership that Venezuelan’s have of their
cars (and the country’s oil resources). Transportation planners can help with the necessary
change in mentality about cars that is needed to make a subsidy phase-out successful. By
effectively planning a public transportation system that takes into account the needs and
characteristics of all different users, transportation planners can play an essential role in the
transformation of Venezuela into a more sustainable place.

Areas for Future Research
Due to geographical limitations, I was unable to gather any primary data that would have added
a social perspective to this investigation. Therefore, future research into this matter should
include interviews with three groups of people: professionals (i.e. economists, planners,
architects, and transportation union leaders), officials, and a sample of the populations. Having
these primary sources affords the researcher a more detailed look at the problems faced by
transportation planners during successful and unsuccessful fossil fuel phase-out reforms in
other countries. Furthermore, learning the specific processes of how planners overcame these
problems would provide valuable lessons for Venezuela, as well as other countries that may
attempt to phase out fossil fuel subsidies in the future.
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Appendix A
Regional Comparison of Diesel Fuel Consumption, GDP per Capita and Fossil-Fuel
Consumption Subsidies
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